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SPECIAL PURPOSE MUNICIPAL ENTITIES AND
BANKRUPTCY: THE CASE OF PUBLIC COLLEGES
Matthew A. Bruckner*
ABSTRACT
This Article builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by showing why
the common analogy between corporate shareholders and city residents does
not hold in the case of certain special purpose municipal entities. For example,
some scholars argue that “local residents” are best situated to avoid municipal
financial distress by preventing it ex ante through the political process or
remedying it ex post by repaying creditors through increased taxes. But
residents’ ability to avoid financial distress is limited when a special purpose
municipal entity spans political boundaries or tax jurisdictions because it is not
clear who counts as a “local resident” in such cases. These boundary-spanning
entities include certain hospitals and institutions of higher education. Instead of
residents, this Article concludes that either creditors or the state are better
situated to address the financial distress of boundary-spanning special purpose
municipal entities, such as public institutions of higher education.
This Article also reviews every decision where eligibility for relief under
chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code was contested and distills a set of definitions
for “municipality” that can be used to determine whether an entity must seek
relief under chapter 9 (or if chapter 11 is available). Then, this Article applies
those definitions to public institutions of higher education and determines that
they, unlike private institutions, are eligible for relief only under chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code. This is the same set of provisions under which Detroit,
Michigan and Stockton, California sought relief. But because many states
restrict access to chapter 9 entirely, access to the bankruptcy courts may be
completely unavailable for public institutions of higher education in those states.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial distress continues to plague institutions of higher education
(IHEs), including public IHEs.1 For example, in 2019 Alaska threatened to slash
its higher education budget by $135 million, equivalent to a “41 percent
reduction in state funding.”2 The severity of these cuts prompted an “unusual”
letter from the University of Alaska’s accrediting body, the Northwest
Commission on Colleges and Universities, to the Alaska Legislature warning
that the cuts could “potentially jeopardize the accreditation status of these
institutions.”3 Also arguing against the cuts, University of Alaska president
Jim Johnsen claimed that the size of these reductions would force the system to:
abruptly halt[] numerous student career pathways midstream,
eliminat[e] services or shut[] down community campuses or
universities[,] . . . discontinu[e] . . . programs and services with little
or no notice, and that in turn will have ripple effects, damaging UA’s
ability to generate revenue and causing even greater harm across the
state.4

In response to these cuts, the University of Alaska system declared a “socalled financial exigency,” which would allow employees, including tenured
professors, to be quickly fired and programs, or even entire campuses, to be
closed.5 Financial exigency has been called the “the academic equivalent of
bankruptcy reorganization . . . .”6 But why not use the regular bankruptcy
system? After all, debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding gain access to a set of tools
for resolving that entity’s financial distress.7

1
Many land grant colleges and universities have become public IHEs in the way we think about these
categories today. As such, the analysis contained herein applies to them as it does to other public IHEs. To the
extent that a land grant college or university is now a private institution, the analysis contained herein does not
apply to them. See Perry Dane et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 337, 398 (2014) (arguing that
“the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are deeply, and rightly, consequential, the meaning of those concepts, and
not only their specific applications, turn out to be contingent, contested, and richly complex.”).
2
Colleen Flaherty, Accreditation Risk from Alaska Cuts, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 10, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/10/u-alaskas-accreditor-warns-funding-cuts-could-threatensystems-status. Ultimately, the university’s budget was cut by $70 million over three years, instead of an
immediate, $135 million cut. See Doug Lederman, Budget Compromise in Alaska, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/14/alaskas-governor-and-university-reach-compromisenearly-halve-budget-cut.
3
Flaherty, supra note 2; see Lederman, supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
Yereth Rosen, University of Alaska Regents Postpone ‘Financial-exigency’ Decision, REUTERS
(July 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alaska-politics-idUSKCN1UB05E.
6
Id.
7
See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text (discussing the bankruptcy toolkit).

BRUCKNER_7.15.20

344

7/15/2020 2:05 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

As discussed in several earlier articles, bankruptcy reorganization is
functionally unavailable to nearly all IHEs because the Higher Education Act
(HEA) makes entering bankruptcy “an effective death sentence” for most IHEs.8
I’ve argued that this should be changed.9 But even if the HEA were to be
amended, bankruptcy reorganization would remain unavailable for many public
IHEs because of state restrictions on bankruptcy access.
This Article highlights that public IHEs are, in many states, doubly barred
from bankruptcy reorganization—one legal bar and one economic. By analyzing
the existing case law on access to chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, this Article
concludes that public IHEs are likely to be classified as municipalities for
bankruptcy purposes, meaning they are barred from using chapter 11. Instead of
using chapter 11, they may use chapter 9, if they have access at all. Access to
chapter 9 is severely restricted, with “[o]nly twelve states specifically
authoriz[ing] chapter 9 filings. Fifteen state[s] offer some limited form of
chapter 9 filings for municipalities. The remaining 23 states do not authorize
chapter 9 filings for municipalities.”10 In other words, in approximately half the
states, public IHEs have no access to bankruptcy reorganization in any form.11
Finally, this Article engages with the literatures on municipal financial
distress and the governance of financially distressed entities to consider their
application to public IHEs. Municipal bankruptcy law must balance the interests
8
Matthew Adam Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2017)
[hereinafter, Bruckner, Bankrupting] (discussing the tools available to colleges in a bankruptcy reorganization,
how colleges would benefit from the use of those tools, and arguing for lifting the bankruptcy ban for IHEs); see
Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 228 (2018) [hereinafter,
Bruckner, DNRs] (“Essentially, Congress has imposed an involuntary ‘do not resuscitate’ order on IHEs,
condemning some socially valuable enterprises to an unnecessary death.”). But see Morris Brown: How an
Atlanta HBCU Fell into Bankruptcy, THE ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/
news/local/morris-brown-college-timeline/I8aag6h6giHpHW84ExIAfM/
(discussing
Morris
Brown’s
emergence from chapter 11 as an operating entity, albeit without access to Title IV funds). And while bankruptcy
reorganization is unavailable for most IHEs, IHEs can liquidate in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Mark Reilly, McNally
Smith College Files for Bankruptcy, MINNEAPOLIS / ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.
com/twincities/news/2018/02/09/mcnally-smith-college-files-for-bankruptcy.html.
9
See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 698–99; see also Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 229.
Others have made similar claims as well. See Scott F. Norberg, Bankruptcy and Higher Education Institutions,
23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385, 392 (2015); see also Michael B. Goldstein & Jay Indyke, Bankruptcy Benefits,
TRUSTEESHIP MAGAZINE, (Sept./Oct. 2016), www.agb.org/trusteeship/2016/septemberoctober/bankruptcybenefits.
10
D. Nicholas Panzarella, Determining the Meaning of “Instrumentality” in the Bankruptcy Code, 7 ST.
JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. No. 17, at *12 (2015) (citing Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum, Municipal
Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L.
513 (2013)).
11
Legislatures could, of course, authorize a distressed public IHE to reorganize either through a one-off
authorization or a more broadly-applicable statutory amendment.
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of a state’s residents, local (the municipality’s) residents, and their creditors.
This Article analyzes whether “residents,” creditors, or state financial boards are
best situated to prevent or remedy the financial distress of public IHEs. In doing
so, this Article builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by showing why
the common analogy between corporate shareholders and city residents does not
hold in the case of certain special purpose municipal entities.
For example, some scholars argue that “local residents” are best situated to
avoid municipal financial distress by preventing it ex ante through the political
process or remedying it ex post by repaying creditors through increased taxes or
selling municipal assets. But residents’ ability to prevent or remedy financial
distress is limited when a special purpose municipal entity spans political
boundaries and tax jurisdictions. These boundary-spanning entities include
certain hospitals and institutions of higher education. In addition, it is not clear
who counts as a “local resident” in such cases. This Article concludes that
neither creditors12 nor the state are necessarily better situated to prevent or
remedy the financial distress of boundary-spanning special purpose municipal
entities, such as public institutions of higher education. But local “residents”
should clearly not bear that burden.
In conclusion, this Article argues that because public IHEs cannot currently
reorganize in bankruptcy and because states have not created higher education
financial control boards, many public IHEs suffer unnecessarily, harming
students, residents, faculty, staff, and others. States need to reorganize their
higher education systems and choose a path forward for their public IHEs.

12
Forcing creditors to bear the brunt of a public IHE’s financial distress would be best accomplished
through bankruptcy reorganization, but this assumes that access to Title IV would remain available, which it
currently does not for reasons addressed in earlier work. See supra note 9.
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MANY PUBLIC IHES ARE FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED

Even before the losses IHEs are anticipating because of the novel
coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, many public IHEs were in financial trouble.13 On an
inflation-adjusted basis, funding for public IHEs is down substantially since the
2008 recession, with twenty states cutting per student support “by more than 20
percent,” and nine states cutting more than 30 percent.14 And the cuts continue.
Alaska just cut approximately twenty percent of its planned allocation to the
University of Alaska system (after threatening a forty percent reduction).15 The
threatened cuts were expected to result in “massive” layoffs, and a drop “in
student enrollment because of program eliminations and reputational damage to
the institutions.”16 But even the smaller reduction would result in restrictions,
administrative consolidation, and restructuring.17
In Wisconsin, state funding dropped by “$362 million from fiscal 2012 to
2017,” forcing “campuses to lay off employees, freeze vacant positions,
consolidate administrative functions, cut back on academic advising and offer
fewer course sections.”18 Similarly, the University of Puerto Rico expects to
receive less than half the appropriation it has historically received from the
Puerto Rican government.19

13
Michael Mitchell et al., Unkept Promises: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Access and Equity,
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-andtax/unkept-promises-state-cuts-to-higher-education-threaten-access-and (“Overall state funding for public twoand four-year colleges in the school year ending in 2018 was more than $7 billion below its 2008 level, after
adjusting for inflation.”); cf. Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 700–05 (discussing the financial headwinds
faced by many IHEs); Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 231–38; Matthew Adam Bruckner, Terminating Tenure:
Rejecting Tenure Contracts in Bankruptcy, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 258–61 (2018) [hereinafter, Bruckner,
Terminating Tenure].
14
Mitchell et al, supra note 13, at 3.
15
Nick Hazelrigg, ‘Shocking’ Cut May Force Layoffs for Alaska’s Universities, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(July 1, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/01/imminent-massive-cuts-could-force-facultystaff-layoffs-university-alaska-system.
16
Id.
17
See Doug Lederman, Budget Compromise in Alaska, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/14/alaskas-governor-and-university-reach-compromise-nearlyhalve-budget-cut.
18
Karen Herzog & Jason Stein, Walker Proposes Tuition Cut, UW Funding Boost, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/07/gov-scott-walker-announcedetails-his-university-wisconsin-tuition-cut-tuesday/97586678/.
19
By 2022, its appropriation is expected to drop “under $400 million, 56 percent lower than
the $879 million baseline figure at which the Puerto Rican government historically funded the university’s
operations.” Elizabeth Redden, Deep Cuts in Puerto Rico, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 11, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/11/university-puerto-rico-faces-deep-cuts-appropriations#.XS4
g74xpmk8.twitter (citing “estimates that the university has lost about 40 percent of its professors from attrition
over the past decade” while tuition has nearly tripled on a per credit basis).
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It is not clear that public IHEs will have to endure the “transformative realignment” that some commentators have long predicted for the entire higher
education sector—though the current pandemic will surely have long-lasting
effects.20 But it is also undeniable that some IHEs that are currently struggling
will merge or close.21 Scores of IHEs close every year,22 including more than
two dozen public IHEs in the last few years.23
Most IHEs that close are small, for-profit trade schools, such as cosmetology
schools.24 But “a significant number” of small independent colleges have
shuttered their doors, most of which suffered from a mix of questionable
management, enrollment declines, and adverse economic headwinds.25 Closer

20
See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, The Coming Higher-Ed Revolution, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Winter 2012),
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-coming-higher-ed-revolution (describing the higher
education industry as being on the “verge of . . . a transformative re-alignment”); Doug Lederman, The Culling
of Higher Ed Begins, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 19, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/19/
number-colleges-and-universities-drops-sharply-amid-economic-turmoil [hereinafter, Lederman, Culling]
(noting that “[i]t has become trendy to predict that higher education is on the verge of a major collapse . . . .”).
21
“Georgia, which has lapped all other states with a five-round consolidation tear that has combined 14
institutions into seven since 2011 and currently has leaders attempting to fold four more into two institutions.”
Rick Seltzer, Are Mergers in Pennsylvania Higher Ed’s Future?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/27/mergers-havent-been-part-pennsylvania-public-higher-edspast-might-future-be.
22
Almost 100 (predominantly private) IHEs closed for good in 2015–16. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Education Should Address Oversight and Communication Gaps in Its Monitoring of
the Financial Condition of Schools (Aug. 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686709.pdf; see also
Richard Fossey, 763 Colleges and Schools Closed Last Year, and Most of Their Former Students Have Student
Loan Debt, CONDEMNED TO DEBT: THE $TUDENT LOAN CRISIS (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.condemnedtodebt.
org/2017/03/763-colleges-and-schools-closed-last.html (more than 13,000 federal-aid-receiving, postsecondary schools (or branch campuses) have closed since 1984); Goldstein & Indyke, supra note 9 (noting that
160 independent colleges have closed since 2000); Lederman, Culling, supra note 20; Kate Smith, Here’s What
Happens to Endowments When Colleges Close, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-03-06/orphan-endowments-of-dead-schools-bedevil-states-across-america (citing figures from the
Education Department to conclude that hundreds of college campuses close each year, including 763 campuses
in 2016).
23
Lederman, Culling, supra note 20 (“The number of public colleges edged down to 1,985 in 2016–17,
from 1,990 in 2015–16 and 2,009 in 2012–13.”).
24
Fossey, supra note 22 (describing most closed schools as “small propriety trade schools, barber
schools, schools of cosmetology, etc, which had relatively small numbers of students.”).
25
Id.; see also Doug Lederman, Another Small Private Closes Its Doors: Dowling College, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (June 1, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/06/01/another-small-privatecloses-its-doors-dowling-college. However, some closures have been large, publicly-traded educational
enterprises. See, e.g., Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 704 (discussing the collapse of Corinthian and
Anthem colleges).
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to home for many readers may be the news that, since 2017, six law schools have
closed or announced they will close.26 Other law schools have merged.27
But most relevant to this Article, public IHEs are also struggling.28 In the
last few years, twenty-five public IHEs closed.29 And more might follow,
including some public IHEs in Pennsylvania.30 Pennsylvania has kept some of
its IHEs afloat through a series of loans, but legislators’ willingness to continue
doing so and the universities’ ability to credibly commit to repay those loans
appears to be wearing out.31 The Pennsylvania higher education system has
weakened financially because of adverse demographic trends, falling

26
These schools are Arizona Summit Law School, Charlotte School of Law, Indiana Tech Law School,
Savannah Law School, Valparaiso University Law School, and Whittier Law School. See Welcome to Arizona
Summit Law School, ARIZ. SUMMIT LAW SCH., https://azsummitlaw.edu/index.php (last accessed Apr. 2, 2019);
Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-school-of-law-closes.html?_r=0; Marilyn Odendahl,
Indiana Tech’s Closing of Law School Leaves Unanswered Questions, IND. LAWYER (May 31, 2017),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/43828-indiana-techs-closing-of-law-school-leaves-unansweredquestions; Debra Cassens Weiss, Savannah Law School Will Close, Students and Faculty Are Told, AM. BAR
ASS’N J. (Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/savannah_law_school_will_close_
students_and_faculty_are_told; Emma Whitford, Another Law School Will Close, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 31,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/31/valparaiso-law-school-will-close-following-unsuccessfulattempt-transfer-middle; Sonali Kohli, et al., Whittier Law School Is Closing, Due in Part to Low Student
Achievement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-whittier-lawschool-closing-20170420-story.html. Western State College of Law at Argosy University was expected to close
after its parent shut down, but appears to have struck a deal to remain open for now. See Matthew Adam
Bruckner, The Forgotten Stewards of Higher Education Quality, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing Argosy University’s sudden closure).
27
Hamline and William Mitchell merged their law schools, Cooley closed one of its campuses, and
several law schools administratively merged. See Adam Wahlberg, Why William Mitchell and Hamline Law Had
to Merge, MINN. POST (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.minnpost.com/education/2015/02/why-william-mitchelland-hamline-law-had-merge/ (discussing the Hamline-William Mitchell merger); Nathan Bomey, Cooley Law
School Closing Ann Arbor Campus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/money/
business/michigan/2014/10/09/cooley-law-school-closing-ann-arbor-campus/16960617/ (discussing Cooley
“closing its Ann Arbor campus amid a nationwide downturn in law school enrollments”); American Bar
Association Approves Merger Creating Rutgers Law School, RUTGERS NEWS (July 31, 2015),
https://news.rutgers.edu/news-release/american-bar-association-approves-merger-creating-rutgers-law-school/
20150727#.WhJDGktrzBI (noting the merger of Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-Newark); Dawn Rhodes, UIC
Approves Merger with John Marshall Law School, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-met-john-marshall-law-school-uic-20180719-story.html (focusing on the merger between John
Marshall Law School and the University of Illinois at Chicago, creating Chicago’s first public law school).
28
Lederman, Culling, supra note 20 (“While for-profit colleges’ woes may be driving the numbers, public
and private nonprofit colleges have not been immune.”).
29
Id.
30
See Marc Levy, Some PA State Colleges in Danger of Closing, THE MORNING CALL (Feb. 27, 2017,
12:08 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-pa-state-colleges-in-danger-20170225-story.html#.
31
See Rick Seltzer, Are Mergers in Pennsylvania Higher Ed’s Future?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/27/mergers-havent-been-part-pennsylvania-public-higher-edspast-might-future-be.
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enrollment, and decreased state funding.32 As a result, some expect the state to
recommend “that some of the schools shut their doors.”33
Many other state higher education systems are facing issues similar to
Pennsylvania’s.34 And some, such as Georgia, have responded by aggressively
reducing the number of its public IHEs.35 Among states with struggling public
higher education systems, Georgia has shown itself to be particularly willing to
consolidate its public IHEs, with multiple rounds of forced mergers occurring
since 2011.36
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION TOOLKIT
“Going bankrupt” is an expression with negative connotations for many
people.37 But bankruptcy lawyers know that bankruptcy reorganization allows
struggling enterprises to access a set of tools for addressing financial distress
that are generally not available outside of bankruptcy. As a result, bankruptcy
lawyers often encourage their financially distressed clients to seek bankruptcy

32
Id. (“as enrollment dropped, state funding slowed and Rust Belt demographic trends increased
downward pressure on the system’s potential for a long-term recovery.”); see also Kellie Woodhouse, Mergers
on the Rise?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 7, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/collegesstruggle-some-look-partnerships-and-mergers-relief (“Per-student funding at public colleges has seen near
across-the-board decreases in the U.S.”); Levy, supra note 30 (“Pennsylvania’s university system is suffering
from dropping in-state high school graduations, a result of fewer school-age youth, and similarly deep cuts in
state aid over the past eight years. The system is also at a disadvantage with many campuses in relatively rural
areas trying to compete with urban powerhouses such as Temple University or the University of Pittsburgh, or
Penn State and its satellite campuses.”).
33
Levy, supra note 30.
34
See, e.g., Scott Waldman, Consolidation Cuts 3 SUNY President Jobs, TIMESUNION (Aug. 18, 2011),
https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Consolidation-cuts-3-SUNY-president-jobs-2079006.php (reporting
on financial issues in the New York State public college system that resulted in administrative consolidation).
35
Ry Rivard, Going Wild on Mergers, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2015/01/07/georgia-officials-hope-georgia-state-u-can-improve-local-two-year-college-taking-it
(“With this change, he’ll have reduced the number of colleges in the system to 29 from 35 when he took office
in 2011. The system’s Board of Regents also on Tuesday finalized the merger of Kennesaw State University and
Southern Polytechnic State University.”); Levy, supra note 30 (“In Georgia, the state university system is
pursuing a five-year plan to merge eight public colleges into four following cuts in state aid.”); Woodhouse,
supra note 32 (discussing the merger of public IHE, Salem State).
36
“Georgia, which has lapped all other states with a five-round consolidation tear that has combined 14
institutions into seven since 2011 and currently has leaders attempting to fold four more into two institutions.”
Seltzer, supra note 31. In 2018, the University of Wisconsin received approval from its accreditor “to merge its
13 two-year campuses with seven of its four-year colleges . . . .” Kelly Meyerhofer, UW System Merger
Approved. Here’s When the Official Transfer Takes Place, WISCONSIN STATE J. (June 30, 2018),
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/university/uw-system-merger-approved-here-s-when-the-officialtransfer/article_aa4d164b-4983-5306-ab53-b1e766bd465c.html.
37
See, e.g., Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 464
(2013) (reporting that “feelings of shame and embarrassment can persist for years after the bankruptcy filing.”).
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protection sooner rather than later. And the bankruptcy toolkit may be useful for
some public IHEs.38
The bankruptcy toolkit includes: (i) deleveraging an entity’s balance sheet
through the discharge available at the confirmation of a bankruptcy case;39 and
(ii) the ability to renegotiate, assume, assign, or reject certain pre-bankruptcy
contracts, including unexpired leases and collective bargaining agreements.40
Bankruptcy courts also have a convening power that encourages creditors to
renegotiate various obligations.41
The ability to renegotiate contractual obligations is critical for public IHEs
that are “likely to need to restructure their operations and finances in response
to changes in student demand.”42 For example, public IHEs have employment
contracts with athletic coaches and vendors that they may want to terminate if
they eliminate a particular sport program.43 They may also want to reduce

38
For most IHEs, the bankruptcy toolkit includes the automatic stay, which can give an entity that is
trying to turn itself around “the breathing room needed to focus on restructuring their obligations instead of
lurching from crisis to crisis.” Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 245; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2019). But while
the ability to seize the debtor’s property is “[t]he most basic remedy available to creditors in the private sphere,”
courts have long restricted creditor’s ability to seize the property of a public debtor. See Randal C. Picker &
Michael W. McConnell, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 425, 429–30 (1993) (citing City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 485, 487 (1861) (holding “that a fi. fa.
cannot issue against the city of Chicago.”)); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Municipal Capital Structure and
Chapter 9 Creditor Priorities, BROOKINGS INST. (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/
10/moringiello1.pdf (“Public debtors are unique in that their assets are not available to creditors, thus limiting
creditor remedies against municipalities.”); Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 136 So. 82, 84 (1931)
(holding that machinery incorporated into a public waterworks was unavailable to be levied upon, despite the
town having voluntarily granted a lien on the machinery).
39
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 943(b), and 944(b) (2019); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2019). Public IHEs may be
better able to take advantage of this tool than many debtors because they are less likely to have secured debt.
Public IHEs cannot issue blanket liens on all assets as many private companies claim to do. See generally Melissa
B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV.
673 (2018) (contesting the claim that either Article 9 of the UCC or the Bankruptcy Code allows a company to
issue a blanket lien covering a firm’s going concern value).
40
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1113, 1114 (2019); see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 78 (2009)
(“[S]ection 1113 is not applicable in chapter 9 cases, and a chapter 9 debtor is not required to comply with it in
order to reject an executory collective bargaining agreement.”); see generally Bruckner, Terminating Tenure,
supra note 13 (focusing on the treatment of tenure contracts by bankrupt IHEs).
41
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399,
1447 (2012) (“As a convening tool, bankruptcy brings all claimants together into a single proceeding and settles
(nearly) all claims.”).
42
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 247.
43
See, e.g., Blair Kerkhoff, As Missouri Higher Education Budget Is Slashed, Sports Programs Also Face
Cuts, KAN. CITY STAR (July 7, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/article160193359.html
(discussing the cost savings from, among other things staff reductions, that accompanies eliminating various
sport teams, such as field hockey at Missouri State, the dance team at Missouri Southern, and cheerleading at
UMKC).
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headcount in other areas as well, such as dismissing tenured faculty or unionized
adjuncts, particularly in departments that no longer attract many students.44
While some of these contracts are likely to have financial exigency clauses that
allow termination outside of bankruptcy, not all do and many financial exigency
clauses require that certain procedural steps be taken before they can be
exercised.45 Thus, this bankruptcy tool remains valuable for public IHEs.
Public IHEs may restructure their contractual obligations outside of
bankruptcy. But they are liable to their counterparties for the full amounts due
under those contracts if they breach their obligations outside of bankruptcy. By
contrast, the Bankruptcy Code puts debtors in a very strong negotiating position
vis-à-vis their contractual counterparties by allowing debtors to terminate their
contracts and pay their counterparties as unsecured creditors, meaning that
counterparties often receive a very small payout. The threat of reduced payouts
can create a strong incentive for counterparties to restrike their bargain and to
offer debtors more favorable terms. This power is even more pronounced in
municipal bankruptcy cases, which removes certain limits on terminating
collective bargaining agreements, which are present in other types of bankruptcy
cases.46
Another important tool in the bankruptcy toolkit is the ability to discharge
some forms of overindebtedness. Southern Vermont College blamed, in part,
excessive debt as the reason for the school’s financial difficulties and ultimate
closure.47 An IHE may grow overindebted for various reasons, including
because it expanded too quickly48 or because of “lax oversight and startling

44
See Gregory M. Saltzman, Dismissals, Layoffs, and Tenure Denials in Colleges and Universities, in
Harold S. Wechsler (ed.), NEA 2008 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 52 (2008), https://www.nea.org/assets/
img/PubAlmanac/ALM_08_05.pdf (“Layoffs at a college or university may result from reduced state
appropriations for public higher education, enrollment declines that lower the need for personnel, or a decision
to close an academic program to free up funding for others.”); see generally Bruckner, Terminating Tenure,
supra note 13.
45
See Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 284–85.
46
See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 467 (“Unlike private debtors, therefore, municipal debtors
might be able to unilaterally abrogate collective bargaining agreements, subject only to liability for damages for
breach of contract.”).
47
See Lola Duffort, Southern Vermont College Says It Will Close This Summer, VT. DIGGER (Mar. 4,
2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/03/04/southern-vermont-college-says-will-close-summer/ (noting that Southern
Vermont College’s “heavy debt service was a factor in the school’s financial difficulties” and ultimate closure).
48
See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 702 (discussing the rapid expansion of Corinthian Colleges
and suggesting that this may have contributed to its demise); see also Alex Keefe, et al., A Look at Jane Sanders’
Role in the Closure of Burlington College, VPR (May 18, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/ post/look-jane-sandersrole-closure-burlington-college (discussing Burlington College’s failed plan to repay debt related to a substantial
expansion of its physical plant, which ultimately contributing to the college’s closure).
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mismanagement . . . .”49 By improving operations, and focusing on the IHE’s
distinctive attributes, a formerly distressed IHE may be able to balance its budget
and return to good financial health.

An example of a distressed IHE that could likely benefit from the
bankrupcy toolkit is Cheyney University of Pennsylvania. Cheyney, a
historically black college that is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher
Education, has endured a raft of financial issues recently.50 Cheyney’s problems
arise from a variety of sources, but mismanagement seems to be one of the most
important. For example, Cheyney’s enrollment declined precipitously from
about 1,500 students in 2007 to fewer than 500 enrollees in 2018 in part because
the university “failed to open or process the applications of as many as 3,000
prospective students between 2012 and 2015.”51 The university also failed to
collect tuition from students that it did enroll, with as much as “$7 million in
outstanding tuition bills” at one point.52 Even more troubling, Cheyney may have
violated state and federal law, including U.S. Department of Education regulations
related to its handling of federal grant, loan, and work-study funds.53 These failures
have imperiled Cheyney’s financial health, requiring repeated cash infusions from
the Pennsylvania,54 placed Cheyney’s accreditation in serious risk,55 and resulted
in Cheyney being placed on Heightened Cash Management 2 status by the
Education Department.56
49
Nancy Phillips, et al., Can Cheyney University Survive?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2017) https://
www.inquirer.com/education/inq/cheyney-university-pennsylvania-hbcu-admissions-graduation-rate-failureinvestigation-20171115.html (“Those dismal statistics come after more than a decade of unstable and at times
questionable leadership, leaving the school with soaring debt as well as shrinking enrollment. But in the last several
years, Cheyney’s top administrators, along with its trustees and the state system’s board of governors, have deepened
the crisis through lax oversight and startling mismanagement . . . .”).
50
Id.
51
See id. (listing Cheyney’s various issues, including enrollment issues); see also Ryanne Persinger,
Cheyney University’s President: ‘There Will Be a Cheyney in the Future,’ PHILA. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/cheyney-university-s-president-there-will-be-a-cheyney-in/
article_a41725c0-15f0-50f3-b972-30209f1cd38c.html (“Cheyney had the steepest fall in enrollment among the
14 state-run colleges, according to data from the PASSHE. The number of students had plummeted by nearly 38
percent, going from 755 students being enrolled in the spring of 2018 to only 469 enrollees that fall.”).
52
Phillips, et al., supra note 49.
53
Id. (describing possible violations including that “Cheyney administrators raided scholarship funds and
research grants meant for students and faculty as well as other restricted funds totaling $3.4 million. They spent the
money on day-to-day expenses, in possible violation of state and federal law.” And a Justice Department investigation
found “serious lapses in Cheyney’s handling of $29 million in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds.”).
54
Persinger, supra note 51 (noting that Cheyney owes approximately $43 million to the state).
55
Id. (“‘[T]he issue is accreditation. If you don’t get accredited, you’re no longer eligible for Title IV
funds, nor are you eligible for Pell Grants, etc., and we would default on one of the conditions of staying
accredited,’ he said about federal grants, student loans[,] and other funding.”).
56
Dan Bauman, These Colleges’ Finances Are Now Being Watched More Closely by the Education Dept.,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/These-Colleges-Finances-
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Although Pennsylvania seemed willing to work with Cheyney to forgive a
substantial portion of its debt,57 bankruptcy reorganization would allow an IHE
to discharge some or all of its debt regardless of whether its creditors are willing
to negotiate. While debt reduction alone is often not sufficient to return an IHE
to financial health and ensure its continued viability, it is an important part of
the equation. And schools like Cheyney, a historically black university serving
historically disadvantaged students, is exactly the type of school that ought to be
given a chance to recover from managerial missteps. Moreover, IHEs that are
forced to close instead of reorganizing disrupt students’ academic careers, with
some students likely dropping out instead of transferring to another college.
***
In previous articles, I’ve made the case for allowing IHEs access to
bankruptcy reorganization and I won’t rehash those arguments here.58 But even
assuming that the HEA amendments I’ve previously recommended are adopted,
those would only lift the higher education “do not resuscitate” order for private
colleges.59 Unless further steps are taken, bankruptcy reorganization is likely to
remain unavailable for many public IHEs.60 In the next section, this Article
analyzes the existing case law regarding which entities must use chapter 9. It
concludes that, unlike private IHEs, public IHEs are likely required to file
bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the case law is
very sparse, existing doctrine provides a roadmap for courts to use when
analyzing the availability of bankruptcy relief for public IHEs.
Assuming that courts agree with my analysis, many public IHEs will be
forced to wind down entirely outside of bankruptcy because many states restrict
access to chapter 9, and chapter 11 will be unavailable to public IHEs.61 This
Are/244661.
57
See Susan Snyder, Cheyney University to Partner with Thomas Jefferson, Starbucks in a Comeback
Bid, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 31, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/education/cheyney-universitystarbucks-partnership-institute-thomas-jefferson-starbucks-20180731.html (“The state system last year agreed
to forgive $30 million in loans to Cheyney if it balances its budget in each of the next four years, with a warning
that it would be the last financial lifeline.”); see also Susan Snyder, State Throws Cheyney University $30 Million
Lifeline, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/education/cheyney-universityloan-state-forgives-30-million-20170822.html (“Pennsylvania’s state university system on Tuesday extended a
lifeline to struggling Cheyney University, agreeing to forgive more than $30 million in loans if the school can achieve
and maintain a balanced budget over the next four years.”).
58
See supra note 9. I note, however, that the case has only been strengthened because of the current
pandemic.
59
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8.
60
See infra Section III.
61
In addition to chapter 9’s advantageous collective bargaining rules, public IHEs could prefer to
reorganize under chapter 9 instead of chapter 11. For instance, chapter 9 debtors have the exclusive right to
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stands in contrast to the options available to private IHEs, which may currently
liquidate in chapter 7 and which would be allowed to reorganize under chapter
11, if the HEA were amended according to my previous suggestions.
III. PUBLIC IHES MAY NOT FILE CHAPTER 11
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, relief is available to almost every
type of enterprise and individual person.62 However, the Bankruptcy Code is
divided into several chapters and access to each chapter is generally limited to
certain types of persons or entities. For example, railroads, banks, domestic
insurance companies, and, most relevant to this Article, municipalities, are
ineligible for relief under chapter 7.63 And although chapter 11 is generally
available to most debtors, municipalities may not use chapter 11.64 Instead,
chapter 9 is the only type of bankruptcy available to a “municipality,” which
includes cities, counties, townships, school districts, public improvement
districts, and certain revenue-producing entities.65 Although there is no authority
directly on point, the term municipality likely includes public IHEs.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, “municipality” is defined as a “political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”66 While these terms
are not further defined by the Bankruptcy Code, their meaning has been
addressed directly in a few cases. The case law is sparse because parties do not
often litigate over whether a particular entity is a municipality.67 Nevertheless,
this Article will analyze the existing case law to consider whether public IHEs
would be considered a municipality for chapter 9’s purposes. This issue has

submit a plan of adjustment, whereas the debtor’s exclusive right to propose a plan of organization in chapter 11
can be curtailed. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2019), with 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2019).
62
See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2019); cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People,
Places or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2225 (2014) (arguing that administrative resolution is
sufficiently similar to federal bankruptcy protection that they should be treated as synonymous).
63
11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)–(2).
64
11 U.S.C. § 109(d).
65
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1); see, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re
City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015); In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R.
60 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994) (revenue-producing waste disposal districts); In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp.,
427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (revenue-producing horse-racing-betting parlors). Compare In re Cty. of
Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding public school district is a municipality), with In re City
of Central Falls, 468 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012) (holding public school district is not a municipality).
66
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2019).
67
United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012
Bankr. LEXIS 3042 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012), at *13–14 (“In reaching its decision, the court noted that
‘statutory or caselaw guidance on what constitutes an instrumentality, or even a municipality, is scarce.’”) (citing
In re Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
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never been addressed by the courts.68 If public IHEs are a municipality, and if
they satisfy chapter 9’s other eligibility requirements, they will be eligible for
relief under chapter 9.69 But they will not be eligible for relief under chapters 7
or 11.
There are important differences between the relief available under chapter 9
of the Bankruptcy Code relative to that available under chapters 7 and 11. For
example, collective bargaining agreements are easier to abrogate under
chapter 9.70 And this difference is highly salient in light of the importance of
personnel costs to IHE budgets. Another important difference is that relief is
presumptively available to qualified entities under chapters 7 and 11, but not
under chapter 9.71 Because of constitutional issues related to state sovereignty,
chapter 9 is only available to municipalities if “specifically authorized” under
state law to reorganize in bankruptcy.72 And many states do not offer a blanket
authorization for municipalities to file chapter 9.73 As a result, if public IHEs are
limited to reorganizing under chapter 9, many will find that they lack access to
bankruptcy altogether.

68
Given the paucity of case law analyzing municipal chapter choice issues, it is worth emphasizing the
need to be cautious about any conclusions drawn from the analysis in this section.
69
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) provides that “[a]n entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if
such entity— (1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to
be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State
law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter; (3) is insolvent; (4) desires to effect a plan to
adjust such debts; and (5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of
the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has
negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a
majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under
such chapter; (C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D)
reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this
title.”
70
11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2019), which limits an entity’s ability to terminate collective bargaining agreements,
is not applicable in a chapter 9 proceeding.
71
Panzarella, supra note 10, at *2 (“Chapter 11 debtors have relatively relaxed requirements as compared
to chapter 9 debtors.”).
72
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); see also Panzarella, supra note 10, at *2 (citing Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin
M. Baum, Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9
PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 513 (2013)).
73
See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301,
1322–23 (discussing veto rights held by various gatekeepers to chapter 9) [hereinafter, Buccola, Legislation];
see also Laura Napoli Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1191, 1236–37 (2017).
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A. The Political Subdivision Case Law
A few cases have closely examined whether an entity is a political
subdivision for purposes of chapter 9 eligibility.74 Usually, these cases involve
an entity that sought protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and
found its eligibility challenged on the grounds that it was not a political
subdivision. Although there are other cases of political subdivisions accessing
chapter 9 relief, those cases did not contest the question of whether the debtor
was a political subdivision.75
In this section I attempt to distill the key factors relied on by courts for
determining whether an entity is a political subdivision. There appear to be three:
(i) the label assigned to an entity by its creator; (ii) the statutes or regulations
governing the formation of such entities; and (iii) the powers possessed by the
entity in question. Each will be explored in more detail.
Several of the relevant cases considering whether an entity was a political
subdivision have focused their analysis primarily on the label ascribed to the
bankrupt entity by statute.76 For example, in In re Sullivan County Regional
Refuse Disposal District, the court determined that two garbage disposal
facilities were political subdivisions because the entities were “statutorily
defined as a body politic and corporate.”77 Similarly, in In re Boise County, the
bankruptcy court concluded that Boise County, Idaho was a political subdivision
for chapter 9’s purposes because Idaho state law describes counties as “a body

74
The issue has been raised in other instances, but in those cases, the courts did not provide a reasoned
analysis as to why the relevant entity was a political subdivision. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse
Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Boise Cty., 465 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011);
In re Columbia Falls, Special Improv. Dist. No. 25, 143 B.R. 750 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992); In re Cty. of Orange,
183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
75
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re City of Stockton, 526
B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
76
See United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305,
2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012) (“The final factor considers the state’s own
classification or description of the entity. When an entity is created as a ‘body corporate and politic,’ courts
generally find that the entity is a governmental unit.”) (citing In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr.
C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Pleasant View Util. Dist. of Cheatham Cty., 24 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982);
In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing McKinney’s Racing, PariMutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 603(1), which describes OTB as a “body corporate and politic.”).
77
In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994). However,
the court found that the waste disposal districts were ineligible for chapter 9 because they had failed to engage
in good faith, pre-filing efforts to restructure their debts. See id. at 82 (“[T]he debtors still deliberately refrained
from accessing their primary asset to attempt to resolve their financial problems.”).
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politic and corporate.”78 This fact alone was sufficient for the court and no
further discussion of the question occurred.79
By contrast, other cases have focused on whether the entity in question
“possess[ed] the characteristics of a sovereign”80 and whether they perform
functions that are “essentially governmental in nature.”81 These cases find
support for their approach in the IRS’s definition of “political subdivision,”
which is “any division of any State or local government unit which is a municipal
corporation or which has been delegated the right to exercise part of the
sovereign power of the unit.”82 At a minimum, elements of sovereign power
include: “the power to tax, the power of eminent domain or the police
power.”83 In In re County of Orange, the court found that the bankrupt entity (an
investment vehicle, not the county itself) had “neither sovereign power
delegated to it by the State of California, nor . . . [did] it have by its existence
some inherent sovereign power to act.”84 Instead, the bankrupt entity was merely
“an investment vehicle formed by the County and administered by the Treasurer
to receive, commingle, invest, hold, account for, and distribute funds of the
participants who are authorized by state law to deposit their excess funds with
the Treasurer.”85

78
In re Boise Cty., 465 B.R. at 167 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011) (“Under Idaho law, the County is a body
politic of the state of Idaho. See Idaho Code § 31-601”) (emphasis in original).
79
Although other courts sometimes discuss additional factors, a legislature’s decision to designate an
entity as a body politic and corporate appears to be a salient fact in almost every case where a court has
determined that an entity is a municipality. See, e.g., In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1994). This is true even when the court’s analysis suggests that other factors were considered.
80
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l
Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60; In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3042,
at *7.
81
In re N.Y.C. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 261, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding
that New York City’s Off-Track Betting Corporation, which operated “a pari-mutuel betting system” with the
dual purposes of raising revenue and “fighting the role of organized crime in horse-race gambling,” was a
municipality).
82
26 C.F.R. § 1.103-1(b) (2011) (suggesting that political subdivisions may “include special assessment
districts so created, such as road, water, sewer, gas, light, reclamation, drainage, irrigation, levee, school, harbor,
port improvement, and similar districts and divisions of any such unit.”) (emphasis added).
83
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg’s Estate, 144
F. 2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945) (Although Shamberg only required that part or a
portion of those powers be present to conclude that an entity created under state law for a governmental purpose
is a political subdivision, subsequent authorities indicate that possession of only an insubstantial amount of any
or all sovereign powers is not sufficient); Mark Norell et al., Comments on the Definition of Political Subdivision
for Tax-Exempt Bonds and Other Tax-Advantaged Bonds, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/tax_lawyer/vol69/692/tax-comments-definiton-ofpolitical-subdivision-p313.pdf.
84
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602.
85
Id.
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Similarly, the Seven Counties court noted that the debtor was allowed to
“seek a special ad valorem tax” if the board believed it lacked sufficient
funding.86 However, the court concluded that Seven Counties lacked the
traditional government power to tax because the entity could only request an
assessment and could not levy the tax directly.87 This finding supported the
court’s conclusion that the debtor was not a political subdivision.
But, the power to tax is not a mandatory feature for all political subdivisions.
For example, the court in Charlton County considered a broader array of
“[a]ttributes that tend to establish that an entity is governmental in nature
includ[ing]: that it is a creature of specific legislative enactment, that it has
sovereign immunity, that it may exercise the right of eminent domain, that it is
tax-exempt, that it has the power to tax, and that it receives tax revenues.”88
There, the court concluded that the debtor was a governmental unit,89 in part,
because it was “a creature of specific legislative enactment,” could “exercise the
right of eminent domain to acquire property,” was “exempt from paying taxes
in the same way cities and counties are exempt from taxes for the operation of
similar facilities,” was “authorized to receive tax revenues from the County’s
general fund or from an ad valorem tax,” and was “also authorized to issue taxexempt revenue anticipation certificates which are declared to be issued for an
essential public and governmental purpose.”90 The debtor lacked sovereign
immunity and the power to levy taxes directly, but the court found that entity
may be a governmental unit if it enjoys “numerous governmental powers.”91
B. Application to Public IHEs
This section applies the three factors just identified from the case law to
public IHEs. It concludes that in many states, courts are likely to determine that
public IHEs are political subdivisions. As such, they are eligible only for
bankruptcy relief under chapter 9, if at all.
86

In re Seven Ctys. Srvcs., 550 B.R. 741, 758 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
Id.
88
United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305, 2012
Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012); see also In re Lombard Public Facilities Corp., 579
B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) (suggesting that the phrase “governmental unit” denotes an entity “actually
carrying out some governmental function” and finding that “a commercial enterprise which competes with others
in the hotel and convention center industry” is not such a function).
89
While “[t]he definition of ‘governmental unit’ is broader than the definition of ‘municipality,’” the
same factors are relevant to both inquiries. In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS
3042, at *14.
90
Id. at *16.
91
Id. at *7 (specifically noting that sovereign immunity “is only one of many traditional government
attributes that an entity may possess”).
87
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The determinative factor in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal
District and In re Boise County was the states’ own description of the entities as
“a body politic.”92 At least twenty-one states define one or more of their state
universities as a “body politic and corporate.”93 Thus, under the Sullivan/Boise
test, public IHEs in these states would be considered municipalities.
Additionally, some states describe their public IHE systems as an “arm of the
state,” which seems sufficiently analogous that a court is likely to determine that
those entities are also political subdivisions.94
By contrast, Orange County and similar cases focused on whether the debtor
entity had sovereign powers, including “the power to tax, the power of eminent
domain or the police power.”95 Exactly how much or how many sovereign
powers a debtor must exercise to be a political subdivision is unclear. For
example, the court in Orange County’s language is phrased in the disjunctive,
suggesting that the ability to exercise even a single sovereign power may be
sufficient for an entity to be considered a political subdivision.96 However, the
Charlton County court suggested that an entity needed “numerous” sovereign
powers to be considered a governmental unit.97
Public IHEs are often created by specific legislative enactment, enjoy
sovereign immunity as an “arm of the state,”98 are sometimes authorized to
92
In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Boise
Cty., 465 B.R. 156, 167 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011) (citing McKinney’s Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and
Breeding Law § 603(1), which describes OTB as a “body corporate and politic”); cf. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track
Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
93
This information was gathered by going through each individual state’s laws about the public college
to determine how each state classified its own state school. The list includes Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire New
Jersey, North Carolina Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
94
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-3304 (West 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 173.360 (West 2018); Sussex
Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 543–44 (2012) (noting that an institution may be an arm of
the state for some purposes, but not others).
95
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l
Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60; In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010)
(“No one seriously contends that LVMC is a political subdivision or agency of the State of Nevada. It has no
power to tax, no power of eminent domain, and no sovereign immunity.”).
96
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602 (stating that “[t]he common thread that ties these entities together
is their ability to exercise various sovereign powers such as the power to tax, the power of eminent domain or
the police power.”). Similarly, the court stated that the debtor in Orange County was not “similar in any other
respect to the political subdivisions described.” Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Las Vegas Monorail Co.,
429 B.R. 770, 797 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (finding that the debtor was not a municipality because it exercised
“no traditional public powers: it cannot tax; it cannot condemn by eminent domain; and it has no sovereign
immunity.”).
97
United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305, 2012
Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *7 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012).
98
See Glenn M. Wong & Karen R. Skinner, Sovereign Immunity Saves a University’s Employees,
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exercise the power of eminent domain, can often issue tax-exempt bonds, and
are themselves tax-exempt.99 In addition and unlike the investment pool in
Orange County, most public IHEs may exercise eminent domain.100 However,
while public IHEs have numerous attributes of a sovereign (at least under
Charlton County’s broader conception of this term), they do not clearly possess
the power to tax or police powers.101 Thus, public IHEs appear to sit somewhere
in between the debtor in Orange County that lacked any sovereign powers and
an entity exercising every sovereign power.
But no court has required an entity exercise every sovereign power. As a
result, whether a court follows the Orange County or Charlton County test, it is
likely that a public IHE would be considered a political subdivision.
C. The Instrumentality of the State Case Law
A public IHE might also qualify as a municipality if it is an “instrumentality
of the state.” Once again, there are only a small handful of cases that have
grappled directly with the question of whether an entity is an instrumentality.102
This section also reviews case law that addressed the broader question of
whether an entity is a governmental unit because these cases may be helpful in
understanding the narrower question of whether an entity is an instrumentality.
The central inquiry in many of the instrumentality cases is “whether the
authority or agency is subject to control by public authority, state or
municipal.”103 But the precise degree of requisite control is not particularly clear
ATHLETIC BUS. (Feb. 2000), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/sovereign-immunity-saves-a-university-semployees.html (discussing cases involving claims of sovereign immunity for public colleges and their
officials). But see Jon Campisi, Attorneys: Sovereign Immunity Won’t Shield Penn State from Sex Abuse Claims,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Nov. 16, 2011), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510525862-attorneys-sovereign-immunitywon-t-shield-penn-state-from-sex-abuse-claims.
99
Minutes of the Board of Regents of Higher Education for the State of Montana (May 29, 2003),
https://mus.edu/board/meetings/Archives/ITEM119-112-R0503BondResol.pdf (on Montana’s tax-exempt bond
issuances).
100
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-133 (LexisNexis 2020); CAL EDUC. CODE § 94500 (LexisNexis
2020); Kevin Kiley, Change is Eminent, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2012/09/19/ball-state-use-eminent-domain-spotlights-rare-potent-tool-state-universities.
101
But see In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 799 (“Again, consistent with the origins of municipal
bankruptcy, the key is the power to tax”).
102
See In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., LEXIS 3042; see also In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2011); In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770; In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995); Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Ctys. Servs. (In re Seven Ctys. Servs.), 550 B.R. 741 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 2014).
103
See, e.g., In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. at 859 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2011)); ex parte York Cty. Nat. Gas Ass’n, 238 F. Supp. 964 (D.S.C. 1965), modified by 352
F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966); cf. In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770; In
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from the cases. For example, in In re Barnwell County Hospital,104 the debtor
was an entity created by the South Carolina Legislature to provide hospital
facilities to residents of Barnwell County. A party-in-interest objected to
confirmation of the hospital’s bankruptcy plan, arguing that the hospital was
ineligible for relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court disagreed,
determining that the hospital was a municipality within the meaning of § 109(c)
because it was an instrumentality of the state.105
The court’s analysis centered on the degree of control exercised by the
County Council over the hospital. The court determined that the hospital was
under a sufficient degree of control because: (i) “[t]he Debtor [hospital] is
operated by a Board of Directors, which is comprised of members who are
appointed by the County Council or are employees of the Debtor [hospital];” (ii)
“[t]he County Council created the Board and conveyed its powers and duties by
ordinance;” and (iii) “[t]he Board reports to the County Council, and the
Hospital’s budget is subject to County Council approval.”106 The result of this
governing structure, the court concluded, was that the County Council ultimately
controlled the hospital because the citizens of Barnwell County elected its
members.107

re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994); In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., LEXIS
3042. To aid their inquiry, courts often turn to the dictionary definition of “instrumentality,” but usually report
that the definition is too ambiguous to be useful. See, e.g., In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 756 (citing the
instrumentality definition from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (10th ed. 2014), as “(1) ‘A thing used to
achieve an end or purpose’; and (2) ‘A means or agency through which a function of another entity is
accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body[,]’” but pointing out that “the word’s plain meaning is
unhelpful for determining what qualifies as an ‘instrumentality of the state’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”). There
was some suggestion in In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 760 that it was relevant that the debtor was a private
charitable organization, not created by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. But a close reading of that case finds
that the court does not appear to assign any significant weight to this fact. Id. In any event, public IHEs are not
private enterprises.
104
In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 860. But see In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797 (finding the debtor was not an
instrumentality, despite the need for the governor to approve the debtor’s fare structure and budget, and to
appoint its directors, because the debtor “operates its day-to-day business in significant isolation from the
State.”).
107
In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. at 860. By contrast, the County of Orange court determined that
an entity that was an instrumentality of a county was not a municipality because it was not an instrumentality of
the state. In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 603. This appears to be different from the conclusion reached by
Barnwell County. However, one difference may be that in County of Orange, there was “no enactment of the
California legislature creates or establishes the [debtor] as a political subdivision, public agency or
instrumentality of the State of California.” In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 600. By contrast, the debtor in
Barnwell County was created through an act of the South Carolina legislature. In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471
B.R. at 853.
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Similarly, in Las Vegas Monorail, the Governor had the authority to approve
the prices the debtor charged and its overall budget, and to appoint its
directors.108 Yet the court found that the debtor was not an instrumentality
because it operated “its day-to-day business in significant isolation from the
State” and “[i]ts creditors are not, and do not expect to be, creditors of the
State.”109 The court noted that “[w]hile the elements of control are many . . .
these controls go to the service LVMC provides and not to protection of
Nevada’s finances.”110 Similarly, the Seven Counties court found that an entity
is not an instrumentality merely because it owes its existence, in part, to state
action, or because an entity has an ongoing relationship with the state through
regulation and because it contracts with the state for the vast majority of its
revenue.111
In addition to considering how a state government might exercise control
over an entity, courts have also considered the purpose of such control.112 For
example, in Seven Counties, the court noted that “[i]f the government’s control
is meant to protect the government’s finances or the public fisc, then the entity
is an instrumentality of the government. On the other hand, if the government’s
control ‘is more akin to oversight or regulation, then the entity is not an
instrumentality.’”113 In Seven Counties, the court concluded that an entity was
not an instrumentality merely because the state government could “impact Seven
Counties’ ‘structure, funding, budget and operations,’” because Seven Counties
relied on state money, or because the state could “name a caretaker for CMHCs
or even revoke recognition of the CMHCs.”114 While these factors undoubtedly
constitute some degree of control over the debtor, the court concluded “that
Kentucky’s power over Seven Counties is limited to largely typical oversight

108

In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797.
Id.
110
Id.
111
In re Seven Ctys. Servs. 550 B.R. 741, 756 (W.D. Ky. 2016). By contrast, in In re N.Y.C. Off-Track
Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court highlighted that the debtor was “a creation
of the state, made for the purpose of operating a ‘revenue producing enterprise.’”
112
In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 789 (noting that “the type of control is critical. If the control
retained or exercised is necessary or designed to allow the State to manage its finances or its fisc—the traditional
concerns of Chapter 9—then the entity is an instrumentality. If the control, however, is more akin to oversight
or regulation, then the entity is not an instrumentality.”) (citing In re Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261,
263 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992), and In re Greene Cty. Hosp., 59 B.R. 388, 389 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1986)).
113
In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758 (internal citation omitted); see also In re Las Vegas Monorail
Co., 429 B.R. at 797 (“Another way to frame this question is to ask whether LVMC operates in place of the State
or whether its operations are simply subject to regulation to ensure that LVMC’s decisions further the public
good.”).
114
In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758.
109
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and regulation.”115 To justify a conclusion that an entity was an instrumentality
of the state, the court suggested that it might expect that (i) the state might retain
some control over the appointment of some or all of the entity’s board of
directors, or its officers, executives, or employees,116 (ii) the entity’s employees
might qualify as public employees,117 (iii) the state would be able to take away
the entity’s corporate status, or otherwise force the entity to close, or (iv) that
the state “can ‘seize or exercise dominion’ over Seven Counties’ property.”118
By contrast, other courts have focused less on the indicia of control and more
on whether state control was directed toward the debtor’s day-to-day
operations.119 For example, in Las Vegas Monorail, the court concluded that the
debtor was not a municipality despite numerous indicia of control because “[t]he
day-to-day operations are still within the purview of LVMC’s officers and
employees, without any direct control from a State official.”120 Similarly, in In
re Lombard Public Facilities Corp., the court required that, for an entity to be
considered a municipality, there be “an active relationship with federal, state or
municipal governments and that [the entity] carry out governmental
functions.”121

115

Id.
This alone does not appear to be sufficient, however. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at
797 (finding that the debtor was not an instrumentality, despite the Nevada Governor having the power to appoint
the debtor’s directors, among other indicia of control); see also In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579 B.R.
493, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding that the debtor was not an instrumentality because while the “Village
appoints the Debtor’s directors . . . it does not control its operations or management.”).
117
Although the debtor’s employees participated in the state’s retirement system, they were not paid
according to the state salary schedules, nor were they subject to “any other state personnel regulations.” In re
Seven Ctys. Servs., 511 B.R. at 466 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2014), affm’d in part, rev’d in part by In re Seven Ctys.
Servs., 550 B.R. 741 (W.D. Ky. 2016). The court concluded this was insufficient to find that Seven Counties’
employees were state employees. In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 511 B.R. at 466. Employees may also be state
employees for some purposes, but not others. See Sussex Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 545–
46 (2012) (discussing whether Rutgers University “teaching faculty are State employees [for] all purposes” and
concluding that they are not) (citing In re Exec. Comm’n on Ethical Standards, 561 A.2d 542, 548 (1989).
118
In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758–59.
119
See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797; see also In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579
B.R. at 500.
120
In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797.
121
In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579 B.R. at 500; Travis A. McRoberts & Karol K. Denniston,
Chapter 11 or Chapter 9: Investors Beware, NAT’L L. REV. (July 31, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/chapter-11-or-chapter-9-investors-beware (reporting that the court found it important to note that the
corporation had day-to-day operational control over the enterprise and that the corporation’s management did
not report directly to the Village).
116

BRUCKNER_7.15.20

364

7/15/2020 2:05 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

D. Application to Public IHEs
Turning now to the application of the rules that we have extracted from the
instrumentality-of-the-state cases, we see that the degree of control over the
public IHE is often the paramount question in determining whether the IHE is a
municipality. More particularly, the following questions all rise to the fore: (1)
whether the public IHE has been created by an act of the State legislature, (2)
whether an agent of the state, such as the governor, appoints the public IHE’s
board of trustees, approves its budget, or oversees day-to-day managerial
questions, such as the tuition it may charge, the number of students it can enroll,
or the courses it may offer, and (3) whether the public IHE relies on direct state
appropriations. Given these criteria, some public IHEs will almost certainly
qualify as municipalities.
Public IHEs are generally creatures of the State in which they reside, being
both created and controlled by State legislatures.122 Public IHEs are generally
created through a legislative act.123 For example, an Idaho teacher’s college—
Albion State Normal School—“was created by an act of the Idaho legislature in
1893.”124 And, most public IHEs have some or all of their Board of Trustees
appointed by the state governor.125 New Jersey’s public IHEs, for instance, are
subject to oversight by a Board of Governors, most of which are appointed by
the Governor and confirmed by the New Jersey State Senate.126 In addition, New
Jersey has specifically designated Rutgers “as an instrumentality of the State for
providing public higher education.”127

122

IHEs are delegated their powers through state laws and the charters that establish the institution.
However, some IHEs are called for in a state’s constitution. See, e.g., Paul Batesel, State Normal and
Industrial School, LOST COLLEGES, http://www.lostcolleges.com/state-normal-and-industrial-school (last
visited May 18, 2020) (“North Dakota Normal and Industrial School was constitutionally established as State
Industrial School in 1889, with 40,000 acres of land to pay for its maintenance.”).
124
Paul Batesel, Albion State Normal School, LOST COLLEGES, http://www.lostcolleges.com/albionnormal-college (last visited May 18, 2020).
125
See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing the ways that Ohio exercises control over
Cleveland State University by appointing the IHE’s board of trustees).
126
Rutgers, Bylaws of the Board of Trustees (Mar. 26, 2019), https://governingboards.rutgers.edu/sites/
default/files/00038416.PDF.
127
Dane, supra note 1, at 382 (“In 1945, the Legislature enacted chapter 49, Laws of New Jersey 1945,
declaring that the school be ‘designated as the State University of New Jersey to be utilized as an instrumentality
of the State for providing public higher education and thereby to increase the efficiency of the public school
system of the State.’”) (citing Act of June 5, 1945, ch. 49, § 1, 1945 N.J. Laws 115, 127); see also Sussex
Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 542 (2012) (describing Rutgers as “a hybrid institution—at
one and the same time private and public, with the State being granted a major voice in management, and the
designation ‘State University’; and the institution being granted private autonomy and control of physical
properties and assets.”).
123
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Public IHEs typically receive a direct appropriation from the State in which
they reside, and, therefore, the State exercises some degree of direct budgetary
control over them.128 At Rutgers, which describes itself as “the state of New
Jersey’s preeminent comprehensive public institution of higher education,”129
the school’s budget is subject to approval by the state legislature.130 Some states
take an even more active role in directing their IHEs and commandeering their
day-to-day operations. For example, South Carolina lawmakers have weighed
in on the curriculum at two public colleges, threatening to cut off funding
because “incoming first-year students were asked to read books that discuss
homosexuality.”131
There is no question that the state often has significant control over public
IHEs.132 However, to qualify as a municipality, an entity must not just be subject
to government control; it must also serve a public purpose. Public IHEs should
easily qualify because educating the populace is a traditional function of
government.133 While private institutions may also serve this function, public
IHEs surely serve a public purpose. As such, public IHEs are intended to be
instrumentalities of the state.
Other factors also suggest that public IHEs are municipalities. For example,
employees of public IHEs are usually considered public sector employees. They
are subject to oversight by the state legislature and are subject to certain
disclosures not relevant to private sector employees. For example, the salaries
of most public IHE employees are generally publicly available. Other rules
concerning state employees, including the right to participate in state retirement
schemes, also generally apply to public IHE employees.134
128
Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing the ways that Ohio exercises control over
Cleveland State University through the grant of state funds).
129
Summer Session New Brunswick, RUTGERS (2020), https://summersession.rutgers.edu/precollegeacademies/about-rutgers.
130
Jonathan Lai, N.J. Colleges Ask: Why Does Christie Want to Cut Student Success Program?, THE
INQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/education/Gov-Chris-Christie-NJ-budget-proposalcuts-EOF-college-aid-program.html.
131
Adrienne Lu, Brandishing Budget Power, State Lawmakers Pressure Public Universities, PEW
(Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/04/24/brandishingbudget-power-state-lawmakers-pressure-public-universities (discussing numerous other examples of state
control of day-to-day operations).
132
Dane, supra note 1, at 391–99 (discussing the “pervasive fluidity of those nagging categories of
‘public’ and ‘private’” and discussing examples that show that “[t]he line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ arises
in many contexts and is contested in most of them.”).
133
In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 797 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (noting that “education, for
example, may be a traditional governmental function.”).
134
Karen Eilers Lahey, et al., Retirement Plans for College Faculty at Public Institutions, 17 FIN. SERVS.
REV. 323, 324 (2008) (“College professors who teach at public institutions of higher education have historically
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Although the precise degree of governmental control over IHEs varies from
institution to institution and from state to state, public IHEs are, as a general rule,
instrumental in furthering essential government functions, and the state
governments have at least some say in the management of those entities. Given
the limited and somewhat muddled case law, courts may not conclude that every
public IHE is an instrumentality. But it seems more likely than not that a court
would conclude that a public IHE is an instrumentality of the state and therefore
a municipality for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
E. The Public Agency Case Law
Finally, a public IHE might also be a municipality (and thus required to file
under chapter 9) if it is a “public agency.”135 While not defined by the
Bankruptcy Code, the term “public agency” was defined by the Code’s
precursor, the Bankruptcy Act, and that definition remains relevant. Section
81(6) of the Bankruptcy Act defined public agencies as “incorporated
authorities, commissions, or similar public agencies organized for the purpose
of constructing, maintaining and operating revenue producing enterprises . . .
.”136 Only three cases appear to squarely address whether a debtor is a public
agency, and none provide much analysis. In In re New York City Off-Track
Betting Corp., the court merely asserted that “NYC OTB is a creation of the
state, made for the purpose of operating a “‘revenue producing enterprise.’”137
Similarly, in In re County of Orange, the court asserted that “the [debtor] is not
a public agency as that term is used in § 81(6) because the [debtor] was not
organized for the purpose of maintaining or operating a revenue producing
enterprise.”138 Even without in-depth analysis of these issues, we can see that
both legislative intent and revenue generation are important to consider.
Finally, the court in In re Westport Transit District concluded that the debtor
was a public agency but failed to discuss revenue at all in its analysis.139 Instead,
the court focused on the following factors: was the entity created pursuant to a
state statute, was a body politic and corporate, the state’s control over the entity
(e.g., its board was appointed by the government, the state could establish the

been enrolled in defined benefit (DB) plans that are provided by their institution and may be sponsored by state
governments.”).
135
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2019).
136
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see Act
of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 30 Stat. 544.
137
In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
138
In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602.
139
In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
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entity’s prices and direct the entity’s revenue to third parties), and the entity’s
possession of sovereign power (e.g., it had the power of eminent domain).140
Somewhat unhelpfully, these are the same factors that other courts have used
when discussing whether an entity is an instrumentality or a political
subdivision. As such, they do not add to our ability to assess whether a public
IHE is a municipality.
F. Application to Public IHEs
Despite the paucity of analysis on the public agency issue, we can extract
some guidance on whether a court is likely to find that a public IHE is a public
agency. Legislative statements or intent and an entity’s design are likely
probative of whether the legislature intended to create a “revenue producing
enterprise.”141 Applying this limited guidance to public IHEs, we can conclude
that many public IHEs are likely to be public agencies.
Public IHEs are revenue-producing enterprises. Even though public IHEs
tend to offer education at a substantial discount to private colleges, all public
IHEs charge at least some tuition. For three examples, in 2016 the Ohio State
University, Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, and Florida State
University systems had revenues of at least $5.1 billion, $3.5 billion and $1.1
billion, respectively.142 Analogizing from New York City Off-Track Betting
Corp., this alone would appear to be sufficient.
***
It seems that there are several good arguments that public IHEs are
municipalities for chapter 9 purposes. Many, if not most, public IHEs are likely
instrumentalities because they are subject to significant control by the State.
Others are likely political subdivisions because they are characterized as a “body
politic and corporate” and exercise a significant degree of sovereign power.
Finally, others are likely public agencies because they are revenue-producing
enterprises. It is also important to note that Collier’s—the preeminent
bankruptcy treatise—takes the view that Congress did not want to unduly restrict

140

Id. at 95–96.
In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 265; see In re Westport Transit, 165 B.R. 93 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1994); In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594.
142
2017 Annual Financial Report, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. 20 (2017), https://busfin.osu.edu/sites/default/
files/ohiostate_financialreport2017.pdf; Financial Report 2015–2016, RUTGERS THE STATE UNIV. OF N.J. 20–
21 (2016), https://uco.rutgers.edu/files/rutgers-fiscal-year-2016-financial-report0pdf; Annual Report 2015–
2016, FLA. STATE UNIV. 10–11 (2016), https://controller.vpfa.fsu.edu/sites/default/files/media/doc/Financial_
Rep/Annual_Reports/2015_2016%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
141
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eligibility for chapter 9 relief and thus courts may be inclined to give effect to
Congress’ intent to have chapter 9 be broadly applicable.143 Municipal
bankruptcy scholars, such as Professor Laura Napoli Coordes, also agree that
chapter 9 should not be unduly restrictive.144 As such, it seems that—under
existing doctrine and policy—public IHEs are likely eligible to file bankruptcy
in chapter 9, if they are eligible at all. That being settled—to the extent
possible—as a descriptive matter, this Article next turns to the normative
question of who is best situated to avoid the financial distress of public IHEs.
IV. WHO CAN AVOID THE FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF
PUBLIC IHES?
When a public IHE becomes financially distressed, there are three primary
options for who should bear the burden of the entity’s debt: the residual claimant
(who are, in the case of cities, often thought to be the city’s residents), the
creditors, or the state.145 Thus, the goal of this section is to consider which party
is best situated to prevent public IHEs from becoming financially distressed or,
if financial distress is unavoidable, which party is best situated to resolve the
public IHE’s financial issues. This analysis will assist in determining whether
distressed public IHEs should be allowed to reorganize in bankruptcy (shifting
the burden to creditors) or not (forcing “residents” or the state to repay the
entity’s debts). In the context of financially distressed cities, municipal
bankruptcy scholars have reached different conclusions about which entity is
best positioned to avoid municipal financial distress or bear the costs of

143
6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[1] (16th ed. 2009) (“the eligibility requirements for relief under
chapter 9 should be construed broadly”). Of course, states remain the ultimate decision-makers about municipal
eligibility for chapter 9.
144
Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, supra note 73, at 1231–
32.
145
Scholars have tended to focus on three possible parties who might be the superior risk bearer: local
residents, creditors, and the state. See Kevin Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV.
1035, 1096–1105 (1997) (“[b]ondholders are, on average, better risk-bearers than municipal residents”); see also
Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 656–72
(2008) (considering whether “the residents, the creditors, or the state—is the most effective risk bearer of a
municipal financial crisis.”); Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437; Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and
Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 840 (2019) (“the owners of locally situated real
estate are, after a fashion, the residual beneficiaries of municipal policy and action, and in that sense resemble
corporate stockholders . . . .”) [hereinafter, Buccola, Limits]; Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1154 (2016) (“Ideally,
the outside catalyst would be the state, which retains substantial authority over its political subdivisions. But
political entrenchment may also constrain the state from inducing or imposing structural reforms that are needed
for fiscal stability.”).
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resolving those financial issues.146 This section will apply their lessons to the
case of public IHEs.
Unfortunately, there is not a clear analogy between cities and public colleges
in terms of who is the most efficient risk bearer. Nevertheless, this Article will
consider the same three parties—“residents,” creditors, and the state. It
concludes that the superior risk bearer is not local residents (and, in this context,
it is not even clear who counts as a local resident or how “local residents” could
be forced to bear the cost of resolving a public IHE’s financial issues). But this
Article does not firmly conclude whether creditors or the state is the optimal risk
bearer. Instead, the decision will ultimately be a political one and different states
may reasonably draw different conclusions on the appropriate answer. This
conclusion has important implications for the normative question of whether
many public IHE’s likely ineligibility for any type of bankruptcy relief is
problematic.147
A. Residents as Risk Bearers
Various scholars, most notably Professors Picker and McConnell, have
suggested that city residents may be ideally situated to avoid municipal financial
distress.148 In the corporate context, shareholders are thought to be the superior
risk bearer because they both control the entity’s decision-making (by electing
the board of directors) and are the residual claimant.149 City residents are thought
to be similar because they exert control over municipal decision-making by
electing municipal officials and because (property-owning) residents can benefit
if municipal investment increases the value of their property.150 As such, some

146
See Kordana, supra note 145, at 1039 (arguing that creditors are best situated to bear the risk of
municipal default); see also Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437 (focusing on residents); Kimhi, supra
note 145, at 636 (claiming that “state financial boards, which place the burden of the crisis on the state—is the
most efficient remedy for local crises.”); Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1154 (focusing on the state as the
ideal party).
147
See Kordana, supra note 145, at 1043–46.
148
Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437.
149
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1046. But see Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166
U. PENN. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2018) (arguing that “it would be a mistake to analogize [the election of the board
of directors] to political contests” because board of director elections are normally not open contests). For
distressed companies, many scholars assert that it is neither the board nor the shareholders that exert the most
control over the entity, but the company’s creditors. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Creditors’ Ball: The ‘New’ New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003).
150
See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 847 (“In the municipal case, residents and (especially) landowners bear the primary residual interest in activities overseen by the mayor or council they elect, because the
value of local real estate depends on, among other things, the relationship between taxes and the municipal
infrastructure they procure.”).
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argue that requiring residents to backstop the debts of distressed municipal
entities is appropriate.151
To allow losses to be foisted upon a different party would allow
municipalities to act in a financially irresponsible manner, exacerbating
problems of moral hazard, or so goes the argument.152 In other words, if elected
officials are allowed to run up debts that city residents will never repay, cities
may be prevented “from making efficient investments in particular parts of
town” because lenders will refuse to lend in the first instance.153 By contrast, if
city residents bear the risk of municipal default, city residents will elect more
risk averse politicians, better monitor municipal spending, and be assured of the
ability to borrow at reasonable rates in the future.154
Even in the context of cities, this line of reasoning is suspect. There are at
least four reasons to doubt that residents are best situated to control inappropriate
risk-taking and overspending by most municipalities.155 And the case is even
weaker when we turn to public IHEs. First, residents are poorly equipped to
monitor free-spending local politicians and prevent them from making poor
financial decisions.156 For example, Professor Kimhi contends that New York
City officials knew they needed to make different financial decisions in the years
leading up to the city’s financial crisis in the 1970s, but argues that officials were
prevented from taking the necessary steps because of the city’s fragmented
political environment, including concentrated interest groups, disorganized
decision-making processes, and poor financial planning.157
151

Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437; see also Kordana, supra note 145, at 1092.
See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 475–76 (“Allowing a city to keep all of its assets while
being discharged of its debts is the principal source of the moral hazard problem in municipal bankruptcy.”); see
also Kordana, supra note 145, at 1067 (“The strongest argument for requiring a municipality to raise taxes in
order to pay off general obligation bonds in full is that, otherwise, too many municipalities will seek Chapter 9
protection, exploiting bondholders by paying them off in cents on the dollar under the terms of their
reorganization plans.”).
153
See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 426, 490–91.
154
See id. at 476; see also Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 840.
155
Kordana suggests that residents are to municipalities what shareholders are to corporations, but this
comparison doesn’t hold when public IHEs are the municipal entity at issue. Kordana, supra note 145, at 1056
(“Municipal residents have the functional relationship, vis-à-vis the municipality, of both the shareholders and
the customers of a corporation.”); see also Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 847.
156
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1093 (“Monitoring by residents is likely to be weak in any event . . . .”);
see also Kimhi, supra note 145, at 663 (“the causes of local financial crises are often out of the local officials’
realm of control, [as such] the state’s involvement is warranted.”); cf. Reid K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency
and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 305, 316 (2014) (“the current
legal regime inadequately holds charitable insiders accountable for breaching fiduciary duties.”).
157
See Kimhi, supra note 145, at 663 (“Clearly the officials understood the gravity of the city’s financial
position, but the political environment did not allow them to take the steps needed for rehabilitation. The city
was fragmented, its decision-making process was disorganized and lacked adequate financial planning, and
152
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Second, “municipal opportunism” is constrained by municipalities’ need to
borrow in the future, and thus their need to be perceived as an entity that repays
its debts.158 Third, Professor Kordana asserts that bondholders are, on average,
wealthier than the residents of distressed municipalities and therefore less risk
averse. He argues that bondholders’ lower risk aversion makes them more
suitable risk bearers because “risk is more efficiently borne by those who are
less risk averse than by those who are more risk averse.”159
Finally, lenders are already aware that losses can be shifted from parties who
control an entity to those who have a contractual relationship with it, whether
the debtor is in bankruptcy or otherwise.160 For example, a bankrupt entity can
impose losses on its contractual counterparties by breaching executory contracts,
such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements, and then
paying creditors a fraction of what they would have been entitled to under the
contract.161 Thus, the risk of loss is likely already priced into municipal
borrowing.
Although public IHEs are unlikely to use bankruptcy to shift losses its
contractual counterparties, the other critiques of residents as superior risk
bearers have bite in the context of public IHEs. And, if these critiques are not
enough, the case for residents to backstop a municipality’s financial distress is
even more difficult to support in the context of public IHEs. In the context of a
public IHE-as-debtor, it is not even clear who is a “resident” in the sense that
other municipal bankruptcy scholars have used the term.162 If a college
refurbishes faculty and staff offices and then defaults on its construction loan,
should faculty and staff have their salaries cut to repay creditors?163 Should all
state residents have to pay higher taxes because of a failed investment in a public
interest groups blocked any possibility of a significant change.”).
158
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1038–39, 1071–73 (arguing that sovereign borrowing is a prime example
of “a real world situation that the moral hazard-driven analysis would predict to be characterized by an
unwillingness to lend, and by debtor exploitation of creditors if money were lent, instead features willing lending
and a seeming absence of significant problems of exploitation.”).
159
Id. at 1096–99.
160
Id. at 1058 (“Thus private law parallels, in which limited liability shifts losses in bankruptcy from
control parties onto parties with contractual relationships with the bankrupt entity, suggest that a mandatory tax
increase imposed on municipal residents in favor of bond-holders and other investors is neither an inevitable nor
obviously correct default rule.”).
161
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2019).
162
Residents are only weakly similar to shareholders. While both have exit rights, those may be
considerably easier and less expensive to exercise in the context of stock ownership (selling shares) than home
ownership (moving). See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 321–22 (describing the methods corporate shareholders
use “to monitor and regulate” corporate officers and directors).
163
In the case of tenured professors, it may be a breach of contract to decrease their pay. See generally
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13.
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IHE? Or maybe just nearby property owners who may see their property values
increase.164 After all, these groups may benefit from the IHE’s (over)spending.
Yet none of these parties are likely to have substantial control over the college’s
decision-making165 and may not have consumed the goods or services that led
to financial trouble in the first instance.166 Thus, in the context of public IHE-asdebtor, “the relation between risk-creation and risk-bearing [is] tenuous.”167
B. Creditors as Risk Bearers
For every dollar improvidently borrowed, there was a dollar improvidently
lent. In other words, creditors control a municipality’s access to money. In
theory, creditors can use this leverage to force local politicians to take the steps
necessary to either prevent financial distress or address problems once they
arise.168 Professor Kordana notes that the “backdrop of state municipal finance
law against which municipal borrowing occurs” may allow lenders to perfectly
coordinate cutting a municipal [city] debtor off from additional borrowing.169 If
they fail to do so, Kordana argues that creditors should bear the cost of their
improvident lending.

164

Cf. Buccola, Limits, supra note 145.
A possible exception is faculty at a school that takes its commitment to shared governance seriously.
166
See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 820 (arguing that the “beneficiaries of successful municipal
government are not investors in that government (as shareholders are investors in a commercial firm), but are
rather the owners of land under its authority.”).
167
Cf. Kordana, supra note 145, at 1101–02 (noting that the ability for “residents” to move “in and out of
a municipality, makes the relation between risk-creation and risk-bearing even more tenuous.”).
168
Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (“The creditors, after all, control the locality’s most important resource
—money—and this control may enable them to pressure the local officials into taking the steps creditors think
necessary. Localities often need the funds that creditors supply, so officials are often coerced into following the
creditors’ demands. The creditors can set the conditions for extending loans to the locality, and this gives them
leverage to force the locality to undergo a recovery process. Moreover, since municipalities wish to pay the
lowest interest rates they possibly can on their loans, the credit markets—even when the creditors are dispersed
and unorganized—may push local officials to improve the local financial condition.”); Kordana, supra note 145,
at 1099 (arguing that bondholders are wealthier and therefore less risk averse, making them more efficient risk
bearers because “risk is more efficiently borne by those who are less risk averse than by those who are more risk
averse.”); Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1752 (noting that creditors as creditors are not entitled to control an
entities’ decision-making, but noting that chapter 11 can change “creditors (or at least some of them) into”
decision-makers); Weisbord, supra note 156, at 328 (describing “the senior lender” as having “substantial
control over the debtor because it can withhold consent until the debtor agrees to replace blameworthy
incumbents.”).
169
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1070; see also Adam C. Parker, Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State
Oversight of Local-Government Debt and the North Carolina Model, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 114 (2015)
(some states “impose constitutional or statutory limitations on the type and amount of debt that local
governments may incur, although local governments sometimes design creative ways to circumvent those
limits.”). The restrictions Professor Kordana is concerned about may have more force (and therefore allow better
coordination) in the context of cities-as-borrowers than in the case of IHE-as-borrower.
165
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In the context of distressed business enterprises, many scholars have argued
that pervasive creditor control is the norm.170 For example, Professor Rasmussen
notes that “[i]t is now commonplace for creditors to be the driving force behind
reorganization efforts” in chapter 11 cases.171 But there are several reasons to
believe that this argument holds less weight in the context of distressed
municipalities than in the corporate context, particularly when we focus on
public IHEs.
First, although public IHEs regularly borrow money, they do so far less
frequently than for-profit companies.172 In addition, public IHEs often raise
money by issuing tax-exempt, municipal bonds and thus their creditors are more
likely to be somewhat dispersed cohorts of bondholders rather than banks or
similar lenders.173 The nature of the creditor is important. As Professors Douglas
Baird and Bob Rasmussen have noted, “[b]ondholders typically can do little
until a corporation defaults on a loan payment. Even then, their remedies are
limited. Not so with bank debt or debt issued by nonfinancial institutions.”174

170
See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759, 760, n.2 (“While it may seem strange to those unfamiliar with the current practice in
bankruptcy, creditor control is a pervasive fact in corporate reorganization”); see also Skeel, supra note 149, at
919 (“To an increasing extent, lenders are using these loan contracts to influence corporate governance in
bankruptcy. The fate of an asset or division of the company, even the terms of a transfer of control, has been
spelled out as terms in a debtor’s DIP financing agreement.”); Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The
Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. REV. 243, 290 (2019) (arguing that “calling
the shots” in a bankruptcy case is what DIP lenders do); cf. Laura N. Coordes, Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A
New Statutory Bankruptcy Regime for Tribal Debtors, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 363, 405 (2019) (cautioning
that undue influence not be accorded to lenders while arguing for new tribal bankruptcy legislation).
171
Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1755.
172
See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 329–33 (2014) (noting that “[e]mpirical scholarship, while scarce,
suggests that charities prefer to draw from internal capital sources rather than seek external debt financing from
outside sources.”); Charlie Eaton, et al., Borrowing Against the Future: The Hidden Costs of Financing U.S.
Higher Education, DEBT AND SOCIETY (May 22, 2014) at *10, http:// debtandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/05/Borrowing_Against_the_Future_052214.pdf (reporting that borrowing is on the rise, with a near
tripling of public IHE debt over ten years leading up to 2014).
173
Eaton, supra note 172, at 7–8 (2014) (describing the primary capital source of all non-profit IHEs as
municipal bonds, but also noting that “[i]nvestment banking houses like JP Morgan and Barclays today have
helped some higher education institutions to issue general revenue bonds that collateralize all college revenue
in exchange for lower interest rates.”).
174
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1209, 1211, 1216 (2006) (“In the standard model, debt is diversely held
among public bondholders who rely on an indenture trustee to guard their interests. The indenture trustee,
however, can do no more than insist on rigid compliance with the bond covenants. She cannot exert any active
role in the affairs of the corporation, as she lacks the power to alter the essential terms of the loan without the
unanimous consent of the bondholders.”); see also Weisbord, supra note 156, at 327 (describing creditor control
as stemming from the lender’s right to accelerate the repayment of preexisting debt and by offering to supply
additional secured debt).
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Additionally, the mechanisms by which creditors exert control include
demanding seats on the board of directors of the borrowing entity, or the
appointment of a chief restructuring officer.175 But these control mechanisms
require the debtor’s consent, which, in the context of public IHEs, would likely
require the consent of the state governor and, possibly, the legislature. It seems
unlikely that the governor would appoint a creditor’s agents to a public IHE’s
board of trustees in exchange for an emergency loan.176 Public IHEs are likely
able to turn to alternative funding sources (i.e. the state treasury) if the lender’s
terms are too onerous. By contrast, financially distressed companies’ most likely
source of new funds are its existing lenders.177
Second, even coordinated creditor activity is unlikely to cause a public IHE
to increase revenue substantially for at least two reasons.178 The problems that
confront public IHEs—“(i) growing competition for students, [and] (ii)
declining state revenues devoted to higher education”—are largely outside of
the control of school administrators.179 For example, community colleges
generally have open admission policies and thus have an extremely limited
ability to increase enrollment.180 As Professor Kimhi notes,
[I]f the processes which cause the local financial decline are beyond
the local officials’ realm of control, then creditors’ pressures directed
at the local officials will also be ineffective. The creditors can signal
to local officials that the locality’s financial condition has declined, but
the officials themselves are often helpless in the face of the problems
the locality confronts.181

175
Once a bankruptcy case has been commenced, creditors can also displace management through the
appointment of a trustee. While this does not increase creditor control, it does eliminate the debtor’s control.
176
By contrast, “[f]ew companies that encounter financial distress have sufficient unencumbered assets to
fund a Chapter 11 proceeding” without additional borrowing. Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1767.
177
Id. at 1767 (“The most likely source of new funds or the ability to use cash on hand that is part of the
lenders’ collateral package therefore lies with the existing lenders.”).
178
Id. at 1758 (pointing out that lenders may have substantial leverage, but have few legal rights to direct
a debtor to act in a particular way).
179
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 234 (internal citations omitted). See also Bruckner, Bankrupting,
supra note 8, at 701 (“The higher education sector faces significant headwinds, including: (i) growing
competition for a diminishing pool of students; (ii) technological change, such as the rise of online education;
and (iii) stagnant family incomes.” (internal citations omitted)); Kimhi, supra note 145, at 662 (claiming that
local “officials themselves may be unable to address the underlying causes of the financial deterioration.”).
180
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 235 (“For instance, an IHE may not be able to raise additional tuition
revenue if it already has an open enrollment policy or if it already significantly discounts its tuition to lure new
students.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 703 (describing a
college’s lack of selectivity as a risk factor for financial distress). Of course, some state schools are highly
selective, but those are not the norm.
181
Kimhi, supra note 145, at 662 (“They cannot do much about a national recession, they are unable to
stop suburbanization, and they certainly cannot compel the state to send more funds their way or force it to
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In addition, Professor Kimhi argues that administrators “often lack the legal
authority or the political power to take the required action.”182 As in cities,
decision-making at public IHEs is also fractured. At public IHEs, authority is
split across state legislatures (who control appropriations), the governor (who
often appoints the entire Board of Trustees),183 the Board of Trustees (who
approves the entity’s strategic plan and selects the IHE’s top administrators,
among other things), the IHE’s administration (who manages overall budgeting),
individual deans (who control day-to-day spending), and faculty (who may have
a say in various decisions through shared governance mechanisms).184
Nevertheless, for every dollar borrowed, there is a dollar lent. Even if
creditors are unable to prevent financial crises ex ante or resolve it ex post, it is
not clear why they should be absolved from having made non-performing loans
in the first instance. Why should creditors not bear the cost of their lending
decisions?185 At a minimum, creditors are probably better risk monitors than
“residents” and thus are relatively more deserving to take unavoidable losses.186
Allowing public IHEs to reorganize in bankruptcy could help force creditors to
bear the risk of their improvident lending. Thus, it is an option that legislatures,
especially Congress, should consider.
C. State Financial Boards as Risk Bearers
There are at least two reasons why intervention by the state government,
through some sort of state financial board or emergency manager, might be the
best way to avoid municipal financial distress.187 First, the state can change a

decrease the amount of unfunded mandates.”).
182
Id. at 661–62 (“The reason is that while the creditors’ pressures are directed at local officials, the
officials themselves may be unable to address the underlying causes of the financial deterioration. The creditors
can try to force the local officials to take measures to rehabilitate the locality, but the local officials often lack
the legal authority or the political power to take the required action.”).
183
See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (noting that the Governor of Ohio appoints all nine
voting members of the Board of Trustees for Cleveland State University, a public IHE in Ohio).
184
Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (“[T]he creditors cannot implement the required economic reforms at
the local level, and they also do not have the requisite legal powers to force the locality to take remedial action.
Therefore, since the creditors are in a worse position than the state to avoid a local crisis or to minimize its
consequences, it is less efficient to place the burden of the crisis on their shoulders.”).
185
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1058 (“[T]his Article suggests it also may place losses on those who have
lent money to the municipality on contractual terms.”).
186
Id. at 1091 (“By monitoring who will be doing what with the borrowed money in a municipality,
investors may be able not only to protect themselves by charging for opportunistic conduct ahead of time, but
also, at least by charging higher rates, signal the rest of the municipality’s residents as to what is occurring. We
should be confident that investors can monitor municipal borrowers.”).
187
See Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (describing the state as “the superior bearer of local insolvency
because it can address the causes of a local crisis, or deal with its consequences, better than the creditors can.”);
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municipality’s political environment because municipalities are creatures of the
state in which they reside.188 For example, if a municipality’s decision-making
process is too disorganized or fragmented to make the necessary changes, the
state can literally remake the municipality’s structure by eliminating roles and
consolidating positions.189 States may also use their financial resources as a
carrot for municipal restructuring.190 Second, states have “broader legal
authority than municipal officials” and may, therefore, be able to address certain
issues that are beyond the reach of the municipal debtor’s authority.191
In the context of distressed cities-as-municipalities, Kimhi argues that
reforming a municipality’s tax system and reducing its labor costs are the two
primary tasks of a municipal restructuring. There are clear parallels to distressed
public IHEs, which also often need to right-size their faculties, better align
faculty expertise with student demand, and ensure that they offer a
competitively-priced degree.192
And states do have some direct control over a public IHE’s financial matters.
States sometimes force their public IHEs to merge.193 Some states also control
tuition levels.194 And state legislative approval may be needed before a public
see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1155 (“Where the state intervenes to redress structural difficulties
that cause fiscal distress, there may be little need for bankruptcy court intervention.”).
188
See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1154 (“Ideally, the outside catalyst would be the state, which
retains substantial authority over its political subdivisions. But political entrenchment may also constrain the
state from inducing or imposing structural reforms that are needed for fiscal stability.”).
189
See id. at 1184 (“The most common governance problem—our principal focus in the discussion that
follows—is a fragmented local decision-making structure.”); Kimhi, supra note 145, at 664 (“[T]he state has the
ability to change the political environment in the municipality, and thus the state can decrease the political
pressures that contribute to overspending.”).
190
Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1328 (“Governors often have discretion to allocate funds for
investments they deem useful for the general public. The governor could make clear to a municipal government
that such funds will not be forthcoming if the city tries to force through a plan of adjustment he dislikes or, in
the alternative, that a proposed infrastructure project looks promising if the city confirms a plan more amenable
to his preferences. As a functional matter, bargaining leverage can look very similar to a formal veto power.”).
191
Kimhi, supra note 145, at 664 (“[T]he state has broader legal authority than municipal officials, and so
it can better address the external socioeconomic processes”); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1222
(“acknowledging that states have political and institutional advantages over courts” in terms of their capacity
“to restructure dysfunctional local governments”).
192
See, e.g., Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13.
193
See notes 35–36, infra.
194
See, e.g., Robert Kelchen, Tuition Control Policies: A Challenging Approach to College Affordability,
MHEC POLICY BRIEF (Aug. 2017), https://www.mhec.org/sites/default/files/resources/mhec_affordability_
series3_20170824.pdf (reporting on various ways to control tuition, including the express tuition caps or curbs
reported by “[t]wenty-seven of 44 state higher education agencies that responded to a recent survey”). Although
pricing is important, it seems that the variability in public IHE revenue streams are much more likely to come
from the number of students that attend than the price of attendance (though they are related). State officials
seem less likely to be able to encourage students to attend than the college administration, as it is the latter’s
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IHE can grant tenure to faculty, and they could decline to do so, which could
affect labor costs.
Finally, states could decline to allow a distressed IHE to take on new debt
through the issuance of municipal bonds.195 But in this regard, states are no more
powerful than creditors who could refuse to underwrite that debt issuance or to
buy the debt if it were offered anyway.196
But consider other problems that public IHEs face, such as changing
demographics.197 Many IHEs are receiving fewer applications these days. To the
extent that this is a national trend, a state’s ability to alter decision-making at
public IHEs and its greater legal authority are irrelevant. Public IHEs also face
declining state support.198 Obviously, states are sometimes well situated to
reverse that decline and increase appropriations for public IHEs. But if the
problem is stagnating or declining state budgets, IHEs cannot get money from a
stone. There may be greater legal authority but no difference in result.
Finally, Professor Kimhi is correct that states have the ability to reshape a
public IHE’s organizational structure to consolidate authority and avoid special
interests exerting undue control.199 But while states may have the legal authority
to adjust a public IHE’s governance structure, it is not clear that the state can or
will exercise that authority.200 After all, if a public IHE has become financially
distressed despite state oversight, then state control has already failed ex ante.201
Anecdotes about the wholesale replacement of free-spending Boards of Trustees
full-time job.
195
See Parker, supra note 169, at 114 (“Some states also review certain types of debt instruments and
require state approval before issuing the debt”); Kordana, supra note 145, at 1050 (“GO [general obligation]
bonds often require taxpayer approval before they can be issued . . . .”).
196
At least where coordinated creditor control is easy. See text accompanying supra note 169.
197
See Jacqueline Palochko, Kutztown University President: Higher Ed Institutions Must Adjust to
Demographics, MORNING CALL (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/education/mc-nwskutztown-legislative-breakfast-20190307-story.html (describing how some colleges respond to demographic
shifts). For a description of other problems faced by IHEs, see also Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 701;
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 232–33; Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 257.
198
Michael Mitchell et al., supra note 13.
199
Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1326 (“A municipality’s veto power is, however, defeasible at
the will of its state legislature, which can divest the municipality’s elected officials of their holdout threat,
typically through the agency of an emergency manager or control board.”); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note
145, at 1152 (suggesting that “local fiscal crises usually are caused by a governance structure that tolerates
financial decisions in which the benefits and costs of public expenditures are misaligned.”).
200
See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1222 (highlighting at least two situations where states will be
unable to reform municipal financial decision-making); Weisbord, supra note 156, at 316 (noting that sufficient
oversight over the officers and directors of charities is often “inadequate[]”).
201
Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1223 (describing as “very common” that states fail to rein in flawed
municipal financing decision-making even “in the face of fiscal distress”).
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are hard to come by.202 As Professor Buccola argues, existing legal structures
are “sticky” because change often requires a majority vote of “each legislative
chamber, plus acquiescence by the governor.”203 Thus, it can be difficult for state
governments to reform problematic governance structures in their public IHEs.
The challenging political environment in state capitals can help explain why
so many state legislatures delegate the difficult decision-making of municipal
reform to emergency managers and state financial boards.204 However it is not
particularly clear why state financial boards would be less subject to special
interest politicking than appointed members of a college’s board of trustees.205
After all, both are appointed by the governor or state legislature.
***
In conclusion, it appears that there are reasons to doubt that creditors or state
financial boards are particularly well-situated to prevent public IHEs from
becoming financially distressed or to bear the cost of responding to that financial
distress. As a result, I believe it is appropriate for each state to reach its own
conclusion about whether lenders should bear the cost of their non-performing
loans or whether the state should repay creditors.206 In large part, I believe this
decision will depend on several factors, including whether state officials believe
that lenders knowingly assumed the risk of non-repayment, whether lenders are
able to distinguish between public IHEs that remain good credit risks and those
that are not (or if bond market contagion is a serious risk), and the state’s own
financial health.
V. HOW TO OPTIMIZE PUBLIC IHES’ FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE?
This section will address the normative issue of whether public IHEs should
be required to file bankruptcy under chapter 9. Alternatives include leaving
creditors with state law collection remedies, or using a state financial board

202
It would be an interesting empirical project to examine how often trustees are replaced in the months
leading up to and soon after an IHE’s financial crisis. Cf. Weisbord, supra note 156, at 309 (discussing how the
bankruptcy court might “hasten[] the resignation or removal of blameworthy officers and directors”).
203
Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1323 (“Rules are sticky when only a majority in each legislative
chamber, plus acquiescence by the governor, can change them. Depending on the rules peculiar to a given state’s
legislative process, a small minority may be able to defeat even legislation with strong support.”).
204
See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 316 (discussing the need to remove incumbent managers of charities
in some cases “to protect the public interest from continued neglect, mismanagement, and misuse of charitable
assets”).
205
Cf. Kimhi, supra note 145.
206
In many cases, the state may also be a major creditor.
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designed to help a distressed public IHE resolve its financial problems.207 Each
option offers a different procedure for resolving a public IHE’s financial distress
“and each places the burden of the crisis on a different entity.”208
If state officials believe that it is appropriate to force creditors to bear the
cost of their non-performing loans, theoretically, they have two choices. In
theory, they could allow the public IHE to discharge their obligations to creditors
in bankruptcy. Alternatively, they could deny the public IHE access to
bankruptcy and leave creditors with their “exceedingly weak remedies under
state law.”209 At the moment, however, the former solution is largely illusory.210
Under current law, bankruptcy is effectively a death sentence for IHEs because
they lose access to Title IV student loan and grant programs (i.e. Stafford Loans,
Grad Plus, Pell, etc.) if they enter bankruptcy.211
Unfortunately, without a bankruptcy option, creditors are likely to hound
public IHEs in an attempt to collect on their debts. One example is the City of
Harrisburg, PA. In 2003, Harrisburg borrowed “$125 million to rebuild and
expand the city’s enormous trash incinerator.”212 For various reasons, the project
was not economically successful, and the city’s incinerator-related obligations
swelled to almost $300 million,213 with incinerator-related payments due that
sometimes exceeded the city’s annual budget.214 But after Pennsylvania blocked
the city from filing bankruptcy and made clear that it would not bail the city out
207
See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 145, at 654 (suggested that there are three options for resolving the
financial distress of cities: “creditors’ remedies, chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, and state financial boards.”);
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1046 (1997) (focusing only on whether creditors or city residents should bear the
risk of municipal insolvency, either in chapter 9 or through state law remedies).
208
Kimhi, supra note 145, at 636.
209
Buccola, Limits, supra note 145 (“Creditors have exceedingly weak remedies under state law. They
cannot foreclose on municipal property in any meaningful sense, and consequently bankruptcy’s utility, if it has
any, must lie in its capacity to do something other than coordinate collection efforts.”).
210
Where the state fails to prevent municipal financial distress ex ante and cannot resolve it ex post,
municipal bankruptcy should be an option. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1155 (Where the state fails
to intervene to redress structural difficulties that cause fiscal distress “because of its own political constraints,
rather than as a consequence of a deliberate decision . . . we find fewer reasons to preclude bankruptcy courts
from filling the gap.”).
211
See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 228 (“Essentially, Congress has imposed an involuntary ‘do not
resuscitate’ order on IHEs, condemning some socially valuable enterprises to an unnecessary death.”); see also
Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 698 (calling bankruptcy “an effective death sentence” for most IHEs);
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 262; Norberg, supra note 9.
212
Michael Cooper, An Incinerator Becomes Harrisburg’s Money Pit, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/us/21harrisburg.html?_r=0.
213
Id. (“The incinerator, which the city had hoped to turn into a moneymaker, is instead $288 million in
debt.”).
214
Id. (“[T]he $68 million in incinerator-related payments due this year [2010]—more than it spends in
its annual budget.”).
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using state funds, creditors continued to seek repayment. City residents were
forced to find alternative ways to repay their creditors by, for example,
monetizing certain city assets.215
In addition, by denying IHEs access to bankruptcy, IHEs will not be able to
receive the fresh start they could otherwise accomplish by discharging their unrepayable debts, and rejecting executory contracts, including some collectivelybargained agreements.216 To be clear, though, even if IHEs had access to
bankruptcy, they might not be able to regain their economic footing. Bankruptcy
cannot, for example, force students to attend a college if the “product” it offers
is no longer a desirable one.217 And many higher education leaders may think
that bankruptcy is a non-starter because they fear students would not attend a
bankrupt institution.
By contrast, if state officials believe that creditors should not bear the risk of
improvident lending to public IHEs, they should invest greater resources in
ensuring that public IHEs make better financial decisions. They might look to
borrow from structures devised in North Carolina or Ohio to aid municipal
borrowing. For example, North Carolina has something called the Local
Government Commission (LGC).218 The LGC is “legally responsible for the
approval of nearly all local-government debt” in North Carolina.219 Before it will
approve a debt issuance, the LGC first meets with the local government that
seeks to issue the debt to discuss the purpose and amount of the debt and the
likelihood that the local government will be able to fulfill its obligations to
bondholders.220 The LGC can also intervene to either direct local officials to act

215
Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1324 (“The legislature had vetoed Harrisburg’s use of
bankruptcy. Harrisburg eventually entered state receivership, the net economic effect being—in the eyes of
some, at least—to spare creditors at the expense of residents.”); see also Cooper, supra note 212 (discussing the
possible sale or lease of city property—garages—that could repay some of the incinerator-related debt after the
state “made it clear that it [was] unlikely to bail out its capital . . . .”).
216
See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145 (“The economic function of bankruptcy, in general, is to cure
allocative distortions that follow from high levels of debt . . . . By cleaning up a debtor’s balance sheet, it
encourages people to make investment decisions in accord with the underlying value of available resources.”);
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13 (discussing possible limitations on terminating tenured faculty at
public IHEs).
217
See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 247–48 (discussing Sweet Briar College’s “difficulty of
recruiting applicants to a rural women’s liberal arts college” and noting that bankruptcy could not help) (citing
Scott Jaschik, Sweet Briar Survives, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 22, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2015/06/22/deal-will-save-sweet-briar-college); cf. Buccola, Limits, supra note 147.
218
See Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four Cities—Models of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal
Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 881, 887 (2012); Parker, supra note 169, at 115 (providing an extensive discussion
of North Carolina’s Local Government Commission).
219
Parker, supra note 169, at 145.
220
Id. at 146–47 (listing the information the LGC considers and the factors upon which the LGC decides
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or to displace existing officials and act in their stead.221 As one author wrote,
“[l]aying out the ground rules for all local governments and imposing fiscal
responsibility for their actions—as opposed to the vague notion that the state
will bail the locality out if distress is great enough—creates an environment
where political leaders take a higher level of responsibility for their financial
decision-making.”222
Similarly, Ohio has designed an “‘early warning system[]’ to monitor and
alert the state to financially troubled local governments,” which can prompt the
state government to intervene “before a crisis like those in Orange County,
Harrisburg, or Detroit can emerge.”223 The Ohio State Auditor’s Office
encourages local governments to maintain certain financial performance ratios
and collects data on whether local governments maintain these ratios.224
Something similar to either the North Carolina or Ohio models could be
developed and applied to public IHEs to help ensure that they make better
financial decisions.225
CONCLUSION
Like all IHEs, public IHEs labor under the current prohibition on bankrupt
IHEs disbursing Title IV student aid. But even if the HEA were amended to
remove this prohibition,226 public IHEs in more than a score of states would very
likely remain cut off from bankruptcy entirely. This conclusion emerges from a
first-of-its-kind parsing of the existing case law on the eligibility of various
entities for either chapter 9 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Access to bankruptcy reorganization could make a difference for some
public IHEs. It cannot fix all the problems that ail IHEs, but it could help them
reduce expenses by, for example, allowing them to renegotiate collective

whether to approve the debt).
221
By contrast, without the LGC, normally the state governor must act to remove blameworthy officers
and directors. But governors do not appear to do so. See id. at 152 (“The LGC may also remove individuals from
office. Additionally, if the local unit is not cooperative, the LGC may impound the entity’s financial records and
assume control of its financial affairs.”).
222
Id. at 153.
223
Id. at 113–14.
224
Id. at 113–14, n.22 (citing PUB. FIN. MGMT., STATE PROGRAMS FOR MUN. FIN. RECOVERY: AN
OVERVIEW 1 (2011), https://www.pfm.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Knowledge_Center/Whitepapers,_Articles,
_Commentary/Whitepapers/State%20Programs%20for%20Municipal%20Financial%20 Recovery.pdf).
225
But see Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1235–36 (suggesting that states may not act due to
legislative inertia).
226
Or § 525 were amended to effectively overrule In re Betty Owen Schools, Inc., 195 B.R. 23 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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bargaining agreements, terminating unnecessary executory contracts or
unexpired leases, and right-sizing faculty and staff levels. Bankruptcy can
achieve these goals while placing the burden of improvident lending to public
IHEs on creditors, which state officials may legitimately prefer.
This Article furthers our understanding of the limits of federal bankruptcy
law. Bankruptcy reorganization offers a set of tools for addressing financial
distress but is not available to certain entities. Some of these restrictions are
explicitly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. But others, such as the restriction on
bankruptcy reorganization’s use for IHEs, have been less well-known.
Hopefully this Article, along with the others I have written on related topics,
helps to reveal the holes in the fabric of our bankruptcy system.
This Article also builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by applying
that literature in a new setting: public IHEs. This Article concludes that there is
no one group that plays the role of residual claimant of public IHEs, or that
controls decision-making at public IHEs. This finding highlights that the
municipal bankruptcy literature’s animating analogy—that shareholders of
corporations can be analogized to residents of cities—lacks bite in the context
of certain special purpose municipal entities such as public IHEs. Thus, the risk
of improvident higher education borrowing must instead be placed on either the
state or on creditors. The decision of how to resolve the financial distress of
public IHEs is likely to come down to a political calculation about whether
public IHEs should be authorized to reorganize in bankruptcy (harming
creditors) or if the state should repay the debts of defaulting public IHEs.

